We as students of the Martin Institute proudly present Volume 1, Issue 1 of the first annual Journal of the Martin School of International Studies. In the spring of 2009, Dr. Bill L. Smith, Director of the Martin Institute, approached us with the concept of creating a publication to showcase the academic achievements of those graduating with degrees in International Studies.

The Martin School of International Studies administers an undergraduate major and minor in International Studies at the University of Idaho. This interdisciplinary program is designed to prepare students for success in the evolving international community. An International Studies degree provides the global perspective and competitive edge in careers that help students meet the challenges of tomorrow.

Each student majoring in IS selects a regional emphasis based upon which part of the world they wish to study most in-depth. These decisions are tied to the student’s language study and study abroad experience. Each also selects an issue emphasis. International Relations, Global Resources and Development, and Global Economics and Business are the three options.

In the IS Capstone course taken in the last semester, seniors research a particular problem within their region and issue emphases and develop a policy paper including specific recommendations and steps to take toward the resolution of the issue. These papers represent the cumulative scholastic effort of IS students throughout their undergraduate careers.

Another opportunity available to International Studies students exists in the Martin Scholars Program. The Martin Institute inaugurated the Martin Scholar program in 2005 in order to help IS majors be more competitive for post-graduation employment and admission to graduate programs. Students selected as Martin Scholars become paid research interns working on major global issues. They work in groups of three or four on a predetermined topic, under the guidance of both a faculty mentor who is an expert in the field and the Institute Director. They take a one credit class during the first six weeks of the Fall semester which focuses on the topic, following which they select a particular research topic that will then engage them for the rest of the academic year.

The Martin Scholars focused on the Francophone World with faculty expert Sarah Nelson, Professor of French in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures.

This journal features four policy papers from the Spring 2009 IS Capstone course followed by two papers that are the result of the 2008-2009 Martin Scholar Program.

This being the first volume, our objective is to provide you, the reader, with a glimpse into the endeavors of students in the Martin School and the IS Department at the University of Idaho.

As founding editors, we sincerely hope you learn as much from these papers as we have.

Best,

J. Chad Mann
Senior
International Studies

Alexis M. Olson
Senior
International Studies,
English, & Political Science
It now becomes necessary for us to put our major global problems into a socially relevant global framework. Our world has become too complex, too interdependent, to answer these questions by simplistic answers.

*These problems call for creative thinking...*  

— Boyd A. Martin, founder of the Martin Institute and namesake of the Martin School of International Studies, at the Institute’s inauguration, 1980
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Issues with Population Growth

Global population growth is gaining more and more attention internationally as the strains placed upon the earth and its resources begin to increase. Malthusian economists predict that soon the Earth will have met its carrying capacity for human life. To try and correct for the 20th Century population boom nations need to actively pursue reducing fertility rates.

Middle East and North African nations do not have the highest population growth rates in the world; however, other nations with sizeable Muslim populations like Afghanistan and Nigeria can learn from the trials and success of other nations’ programs. Both nations have fertility rates of nearly 7 children per woman.1 By using pre-established programs these already cash-strapped nations can save time and money in implementing a proven model and tweaking it for their own nation’s need. Many of the nations which, according to Gapminder.org, have the highest total fertility rates also have sizeable Muslim populations and would benefit from bringing in an accepted “Muslim” family planning model.

In North Africa and the Middle East specifically, urban crowding and water resource strains are exacerbated by even modest total fertility rates (around 3 children per women is the global median but is above the replacement rate of 2). Socioeconomic problems are also created by high population growth rates. International and national organizations have acknowledged the importance of family planning. In 1962 Egyptian leaders “clearly identified rapid population growth as a threat to economic betterment of the Egyptian people....”2 Rather, a loose sort of Muslim solidarity was expounded which looks to the Qur’an and the Sunna as its leading forces. Though Islam forms the morals by which millions of people live, Islam’s “role is not uniform enough to have equivalent effects on fertility across different social, economic, or demographic contexts.”3 The political leaders of each country are the most instrumental in implementing family planning programs. Social stigma against contraception can be won by “Using local resources in advocacy for family planning, based on the cultural context of Shari’ah....”4 Several Muslim nations have conquered the social impetus against family planning and have successful programs in place which the rest of

the Muslim world can learn from and utilize when forming their own policies.

International Solutions

In 1994 a conference held on Population and Development in Cairo established that the individual has the right to pursue family planning practices. It is the onus of governments to ensure availability of contraceptive methods to their populations. In theory, this ensures that modern contraceptive devices be made available to everyone. However, in areas where cultural sensitivity towards birth control and different perspectives of ideal family size pervade, the idealism driving individual pursuance of contraceptives lies outside the jurisdiction of multinational interference. In Muslim societies family planning is often “perceived as a synonym of birth-spacing” where “…the ideal family is a family of four children.”5 However, the Cairo conference did worlds of good for establishing international norms which NGOs and multilateral institutions follow when building family planning programs.

Islam as a religion does not have any specific theological aversion to family planning and contraceptives. There are certain methods of contraception which are taboo, and which were addressed in the 1971 Islamic Conference on Family Planning. The conference’s final decisions were drawn from debate among social scientists, medical professionals, and religious leaders from an array of Islamic Nations, the majority of which are located in the MENA. Family Planning policies in MENA nations are complicated by the lack of one solid Islamic authority and the sovereignty of each state. Though the 1971 conference concluded that “Any effort at any level in order to bring the Muslim world out of the state of backwardness from which it is suffering must be made within the framework of the preservation of the genuine Muslim character,” there were no hard and fast rules or policy recommendations which arose out of the conference. The conference did however allow for leaders of Muslim nations to have agreed upon guidelines to guide their policy decisions.

These two important international conferences did a lot to bring family planning into the public eye and to establish norms which are adhered to. Establishing norms not only helps to hold governments and NGOs accountable for their work, but allows governments, funders, and donators to have a means to assess programs.

Government Support for Programs

One of the first Muslim nations to establish a nationwide family planning program was Tunisia. Habib Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour party led Tunisia out of colonialism and set the tone for Tunisia’s progressive nature in the early 1960’s. Bourguiba implemented many changes to Tunisian law which laid the foundation for family planning efforts to be successful. Bourguiba’s support for family planning and women’s rights specifically helped Tunisia’s program to be widely accepted by the population.

Today, “Tunisia spends the equivalent of 18% of its gross domestic product of $21 billion on social programs, especially family planning and the expansion of women’s rights…” Without this funding and strong emphasis on continuing the family planning programs Tunisia would not be enjoying the benefits of a relatively low population growth rate of 2.08% and a resulting near doubling of per capita income.7

Similarly, family planning efforts in Egypt did not fully get off the ground until the national government threw its support behind the

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program. The new National Population Council and its outspoken leader Dr. Maher Mahran replaced the former program and represented a truly viable push by the Egyptian government to reduce population growth. Part of the success of Egypt’s program change was a media campaign using the 70% of rural houses and 90% of urban households that had television.8

Pakistan’s family planning effort was begun right after independence as in Tunisia and emphasized the need for reduced fertility, not just increased economic status of the populous. Pakistan’s government began implementing five year plans to try and combat nearly run-away population growth. In the third five year plan from 1965 to 1970, “The program was entrusted to the National Family Planning Council, an autonomous agency with a full-time commissioner of family planning.”9 Pakistan’s program went against the more ‘organic’ family planning concept that existed at the time which postulated that family planning and birth rates will naturally decrease as economic development occurs. These thinkers saw economic development as a cure all for reducing population growth believing that with greater economic power the birth rate will naturally drop. However, when projected population doubling is able to occur within one generation, it is not enough to wait for change to occur naturally and Pakistan’s first president was truly forward thinking by implementing the series of five year plans. After the third program, however, government support waned until the early 1990’s, when a rejuvenated effort by the Ministry of Population and Welfare recommenced family planning. Since 1985, Pakistan’s total fertility rate has dropped from 6.6 to 3.52 women per children.10 Without government support specifically targeting family planning initiatives little or no change would have occurred in Pakistan as far as contraceptive usage and reduced birth rate.

In 1989 Iran revived its family planning program as a result of pressure from overcrowding in cities and job shortages. Main goals upon the reassertion of family planning practices were “to encourage women to wait three to four years between pregnancies, to discourage childbearing for women younger than 18 and older than 35, and to limit family size to three children.” In Iran a 1993 law discouraged having more than three children by restricting maternity leave after the third child, setting a national norm for family size. A similar law in Tunisia restricted access to government-sponsored benefits for children after the fourth child. As in Egypt, Iran’s program incorporated a media push to encourage family planning acceptance. Strong government involvement in creating and funding the family planning program has aided Iran’s total fertility in dropping from seven children to less than three per married woman.11

The Importance of Contraceptive Choice

In Arab Muslim society, the method of contraception is especially important; religious norms cause certain forms of contraception to be less acceptable than others. Permanent sterilization and abortion are generally averted by Muslims. Though permanent surgery is not forbidden in the Qur’an, many members of the ulema discourse permanent sterilization and some religious leaders forbade sterilization via fatwas, religious rulings.12 Hence, “IUDs and pills were the two most popular methods among consumers in six Arab countries” and programs need to ensure that there be a choice for their consumers if they are to be successful.13

8 Robinson and Ross, 2007.
10 UN Data, 2007.
In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s the IUD had just been developed, and was pushed by many multilateral institutions as the preferred form of birth control: it was a more permanent method and more reliable than the pill. It was also socially acceptable for Arab and Muslim societies. Egypt greatly enhanced usage of family planning services when the Egyptian Medical Association relaxed their restrictions on who could distribute and insert IUDs. Prior to this change the pill was the most pronounced method, and was not as popular as IUDs. IUDs do not come without complications. Thus, by diversifying types of contraceptives available, programs increase their appeal to a wider clientele.

In Pakistan IUDs were originally promoted in the 1970’s as the preferential form of contraception. This changed in 1994 under the Ministry of Population and Welfare; today “Workers are supplied with oral and injectable contraceptives and condoms for distribution, together with a range of medications for sick children.” Contraceptive prevalence in Pakistan under the “lady health workers” program and their contraceptive kits increased in rural areas to 19%.14 Allowing for choice of contraceptive method also upholds multilateral consensus on family planning and the importance of choice in utilization and method.

Social Acceptability: the Role of Islam and Men

Tunisia and Pakistan both have long histories of trial and error in their family planning programs. These two nations have tried to temper “Opposition from husbands” which constitutes “… a barrier to contraceptive use in patriarchal settings.”15 In Tunisia, little of the actual family planning program had to deal with convincing people that contraceptives and smaller families are good for the country: the ground work had been laid with Habib Bourguiba’s far-sighted liberalization of Tunisian laws.

Similarly in Pakistan, the strong governmental support for family planning programs in the first decade of independence and the visible overcrowding in what was formerly Eastern Pakistan, Bangladesh, caused the society to accept the need for reduced birth rate. The very fabric of Tunisian society had been groomed to be accepting of family planning practices. In Pakistan, “the government courageously faced the population problem by declaring family planning as national policy and establishing it as a program in the Ministry of Health” (Corsa 400). Men and women alike in these two countries could seek out family planning services if they desired, and make their decision as a couple. It was acceptable for them to do so since the governments had set the precedent that family planning is not taboo. However, even in societies where contraceptive use is not strictly taboo there are still hold-outs: in Pakistan in 2009 “38% of married women wanted no more children but were practicing no method of birth control.”16

Much of these two countries’ success in lowering birth rates and overall population growth rates can be attributed to the local acceptance of family planning measures. The importance of having men be involved in family planning measures cannot be overlooked. “Tunisia’s government began educating men…” and women on sexual health generally and family planning specifically. In Tunisia family planning is supported by using religious leaders and persuading them “to loosen their interpretation of the Koran to fit the cause” of family planning.17

Conversely, in Jordan, especially in Palestinian refugee camps, “Men… seemed ideologically mobilized against FP program delivery, but not FP itself…the FP programs as proclaimed today by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and other services, were perceived as

Alien, aggressive, and coercive.” Arab societies are to varying degrees patriarchal in nature; some women need approval from their husbands to gain access to contraceptive devices. Muslims consult their imams on decisions in everyday life, and the importance of religious institutions in shaping the male view on family planning is central to changing male attitudes towards contraception. In the case of Palestinian refugees the marginalization of Palestinian culture has caused high birth rates to pervade: it is conceived as social responsibility to try and populate for Palestine’s victory.

Nurse and scholar Fadia Hasna conducted a study evaluating the general status of Jordan’s family planning usage. In her study she writes:

Based on a gap analysis between doctrine, policy, and people’s beliefs, this study shows a need for family planning programs to address men and women in a culturally sensitive manner: Men shape reproductive decisions. It is therefore argued that if men were more pro-actively involved in family-planning awareness campaigns, there might be a transformation of values and perceptions around fertility and family planning. Another conclusion drawn from the findings is that local resources, especially religious men, can be instrumental in promoting trust in -and a sense of ownership of- family planning programs in Jordan. Using local resources in advocacy for family planning, based on the cultural context of Shari‘ah, seem effective in changing the reproductive behavior of men.19

Iran’s first family planning effort - implemented by Reza Shah in the decade before the Iranian revolution - was coercive and forceful; though not as extreme as China’s policy, Iran’s program largely ignored its population’s desires under the Shah. Post revolution and Iran-Iraq war, Iran’s leaders decided that population growth could no longer be ignored. To change the pre-existing stigma towards birth control “the government exerted considerable efforts to consult with and obtain the support of most members of the religious establishments.” This support allowed Friday prayer time to be used to expound the benefits of family planning. Coupled with the other innovations of distribution, Iran’s family planning program became immensely successful: in 1997 the contraceptive prevalence rate was 76%, meaning that only 24% of married couples of child-bearing age were not using contraception, a rate of use which is high for couples of child-bearing age.

Iran has taken social responsibility one-step further as it “is the only country in the world that requires both men and women to take a class on modern contraception before receiving a marriage license.” In Iran use of religious leaders who expound “smaller families, citing them as a social responsibility in their weekly sermons” has helped to bolster the turn around of Iran’s population growth trend.21 By including religious leaders in family planning efforts, Iran has ensured that widespread opposition to family planning is removed.

International Support and Funding for Programs

The one commonality shared by all family planning programs in this study is the presence of international support for their programs. The multilateral nature of the population growth conundrum ensures that the UN and other global institutions are invested in aiding the efforts to reduce population growth.

The seeds of Tunisia’s family planning effort were planted in 1962 when “a Ford Foundation representative who had worked in Pakistan and was familiar with early family planning efforts in the country” opened up discussions with Bourguiba.22 The Ford Foundation, unlike USAID, IPPF, and the UN, does not have specific policy recommendations, but rather functions as a

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general funding and advisory partner via grants. The neutrality of the Ford Foundation allows each nation to tailor its programs for their populous so that they will be well utilized and presumably culturally acceptable.

The International Planned Parenthood Federation functions in various nations as an advocate and general supporter for nations implementing programs committed “to the goals of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development…. campaigning for renewed political support and encouraging donors to meet the agreed funding requirements...”\(^\text{23}\)

In 2008 IPPF created a policy targeting male participation in sexual health and reproduction issues which relies on partnering with males on a spectrum of health related issues from reducing violence to aiding in access to contraception providers.

USAID and the UN have stricter rules of adherence when applying funding and program support. UN sponsored health centers which also help with contraceptive distribution are aligned with methods and standards set by the WHO. Though these programs are distributed with the permission of the state, they are often independent of the national programs, and function differently from public health centers in many nations. USAID states on its website that its policies are “implemented through standard provisions inserted in all grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts that include family planning activities.”\(^\text{24}\) USAID has strict restrictions on programs that allow abortions and uses contracts to ensure that funding is utilized only by pre-approved programs that align their policies with USAID.

USAID has been active in Egypt, providing support for multiple programs over time. Expansion of the Egyptian Family Planning Association to bring in private medical providers alongside the Family of the Future program was underwritten by USAID in 1981. Having private sector support allowed the family planning program to be even further reaching: easy access to contraceptive methods could now be found in any doctor’s office or pharmacy. Six years later, USAID approved funds to improve facilities for Egyptian Family Planning Association clinics and broaden the number to widen availability and quality of care.\(^\text{25}\) Without foreign financial support for its programs, Egypt’s family planning efforts would be stunted by its inability to self-fund the wide range of programs.

Distribution Methods

As Pakistan’s family planning program began to age, certain gaps were discovered in the method of distribution of care, especially in rural areas. The establishment of permanent clinics was found to be too expensive and the clinics were under utilized. To overcome the distance barrier to care the Pakistani government came up with a creative solution. Rather than having mobile units distribute care as other nations with large rural populations and little infrastructure, “In 1993, the government of Pakistan started a new approach to the delivery of contraceptive services by training literate married women to provide doorstep advice and supplies in their own neighboring communities.” These “lady health workers” drastically changed the face of Pakistan’s rural family planning efforts. A required level of education ensured that community members respect the women, and a training period and monthly reports ensure that the workers maintain an acceptable level of care quality and knowledge. The program worked: “Married women living within 5km of 2 community-based workers were significantly more likely to be using a modern, reversible method of contraception than those with no access...”\(^\text{26}\)

Iran implemented a unique blend of access points to family planning methods. An array of “mobile clinics and 15,000 ‘health houses’ provides family planning and health services to


\(^{25}\) Robinson and Ross, 2007.

\(^{26}\) Sultan, Cleland, and Ali, 2002.
four fifths of Iran’s rural population.” 27 Iran also has a government sanctioned condom factory which provides condoms to the population free of charge. Relatively well funded and easily accessible primary care facilities deliver family planning services and have their own government sponsored budget. In Iran, “the Ministry of Health which was given responsibility for the program and generous resources to provide free contraceptive services to all married couples.” As in Pakistan, Iran helped to bolster the use of contraceptives via “the extensive deployment of local rural health workers” that increased rural usage as well as contraceptive prevalence to 76%.28

By actively seeking out women who may need access to contraception, Iran and Pakistan have made sure that their entire populations can access family planning methods. Free contraception has also ensured that ability to pay is a non-issue. By working along side their public health systems both Pakistan and Iran have used existing facilities and infrastructure to help cut costs for their family planning programs while at the same time still maintaining care quality and access.

Jordan’s distribution methods are more varied than they are cohesive. Palestinian refugee camps rely on programs run by the UN. Jordanian women can access Maternal Health Centers, which are administered through the Ministry of Health. Alongside the government sponsored program are “military services, the Soldiers’ Families Welfare Clinic (SFWC)...a pioneer model of community-based distribution of contraceptives in Jordan.” The community-based program did more to promote family planning usage. Access to larger international funds also made the quality of UN clinics and SFWC much higher than public Jordanian clinics. The Jordanian Association for Family Planning and Protection (JAFPP) helps provide mobile services to underprivileged rural populations. JAFPP’s efforts still deliver “almost no FP services in remote areas of Zarqa Governorate...[it] operates 1 or 2 days a month.”

29 The various contraceptive providers in Jordan have allowed for segmentation in primary goals and lack of cohesion among the functioning bodies. This has allowed a social norm to persist which sees the ideal family size as four children, double the replacement level.

Preferred Program

Islam is not a real barrier to family planning programs in the Muslim world; instead, it can be used as a tool for building support of national programs. Higher fertility rates rather persist in communities where people are marginalized, like Palestinian refugees in Jordan.30 Nations that have a significant Muslim population should pursue alliance with religious leaders in their countries and utilize the strong system of attendance at Friday prayers to advocate for sexual and reproductive rights as well as information on how to attain contraceptive methods. Using media outreach programs which focus on promoting smaller family size rather than just health education help to alter social stigmas in favor of family planning. This will lay an acceptable cultural groundwork promoting the use of family planning programs.

Having a separate and autonomous family planning administration run through a nation’s sovereign government is also pertinent to implementing a strong policy. Direct funding and a separate body for providing family planning ensures contraception and care availability and that the administration is streamlined and dedicated. A strong government program also provides a united approach to family planning. Having a family planning board under the ministry of health provides that contraception is readily available in pre-established health care facilities and can also improve access and coordination with the private sector.

In many developing nations the greatest barrier to reducing fertility rates and population growth are rural dwellers that have little or no reliable transportation to get to and from large cities and

towns with hospitals and health care centers. To overcome this barrier to access the most efficient method for distributing care as used in Pakistan and Iran is through ‘lady health workers’. Mobile clinics fail in distribution of care in rural areas because visits are separated and quality of care is often low.

Access to proper funding is absolutely essential in the long-term success for family planning programs. By adhering to accepted international and bilateral agreements on implantation of family planning nations can be counted on to utilize policies which are aligned with normalized human rights standards. As a consequence nations will receive needed funding to ensure continued success of programs.

An appropriate mix of these various methods aimed at reducing population growth need to be pursued. Without social acceptability and education of contraceptive use all other efforts by a government are voided. Access to contraceptives are also important and by connecting with pre-established infrastructure nations can help cut costs while also maintaining quality care and access to contraceptives. Increased cooperation among Muslim nations can help develop successful programs, which can be framed using methods from other Muslim nations.
Save the Remittances:
A Look at Remittances and the Global Economic Crisis
– Anna Brown

so that businesses must lay off workers in order to survive. A crisis that began in the developed world has quickly spread to the developing world through synchronized global channels. The following graph shows the 2009 expectation for growth in GDP to decrease by 1.5% in developed countries and 2.7% in developing countries:¹

The most visible aspect of the financial crisis involves the rapidly rising unemployment rates as the demand for labor decreases. Increased unemployment creates a problem for the developed world, and an even worse one for the developing world. When immigrants work abroad, they send remittances home to their families. A remittance consists of a cross-border typically low-value recurrent payment by a migrant worker to family and/or friends in their home

Background

A Turkish immigrant in Germany walked away from work, head down. He had just been fired from his job as a semi-skilled factory worker in an automobile factory. Why? Because of the global financial crisis presently playing out, making it

These remittances play a large role in the development of developing countries, and for many represent a larger capital flow than official development assistance (ODA) and private flows. Furthermore, they are not subject to the conditions arising through the management of ODA.\(^3\)

Remittances have the added impact of being more broad-based in distribution than ODA, flowing directly to households and thereby avoiding corrupt governments.\(^4\) The developmental impacts of remittances include positive multiplier effects that increase economic activity. This causes the enhancement of incomes for remittance receivers as well, leaving more money for savings. Human capital investment, such as education, may result from these extra savings.\(^5\)

Charts 1 and 2 depict the magnitude of remittances:

Due to their typical resiliency and countercyclical effects in economic downturns, remittances originally were not expected to decline drastically. However, the impact of this one was underestimated and so this prediction has been revised. Graph 1 shows the revised prediction of the decline in remittances.\(^6\)

This paper will discuss possible policy issues for enactment by developed and developing countries, as well as remittance service providers (RSP), to save remittance payments as a source of development. While the focus will revolve around policies applicable now in the crisis, other policies presented can also be used in the long-term.

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6 Ratha and Mohapatra, 2009.
Policies for Developed Countries

Developed countries receive economic gains from migration. Migration scholars estimate labor forces in these countries will peak in 2010, after which labor forces will decline. This calls for a need for the surplus of labor available in developing countries. In addition, skilled migrants and foreign students have an innovative impact on developed countries.7 The sustained remittance flows resulting from efficient migration have the additional benefit of decreasing the need for developed countries to donate ODA to developing countries.8 These examples demonstrate developed countries have a vested interest in encouraging efficient migration. The following policies detail actions developed nations can pursue to support remittance flows.

1. Examine the Remittance System:

The EU and other host countries should look at the remittance system and see which restrictive practices it could abolish to create a more effective system. For example, it must attempt to decrease transaction costs as much as possible, as these cut away at the amount remitted. Also, it should not condone monopolistic RSPs since they raise costs above market and reduce the amount of remittance development in rural areas. One way to fight these monopolies involves developed country support of the development of informal RSPs, such as cooperatives and credit unions.9

Another way developed countries can renovate the remittance system involves reviewing temporary guest-worker programs. These programs attempt to keep immigrants in host countries short-term. However, history has shown these types of programs actually increase permanent settlement of immigrants. Instead, host countries should adopt policies of circular migration. The relaxation of immigration controls whereby migrants receive the right and opportunity to migrate again after an unsuccessful return home will lead to circular migration. Through this opportunity, migrants will not fear their inability to return, therefore creating less need for permanent settlement and family reunification in the host country. Migration will thus have maximum economic benefit for developed countries, as well as developing countries since immigrants will maintain jobs and the ability to remit.10 With further analysis and improvement of the remittance system, the effectiveness of remittances will reach full developmental potential.

2. Review Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Regulations:

Developed countries should look at restrictive regulations preventing terrorist financing and money laundering on remittances introduced after 9/11 and ensure their effectiveness. Such regulations include the requirement of identification when sending or receiving remittances, record keeping, and the report

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9 Steinbäck, 2009.
10 Haas, 2005.
of suspicious activity. These regulations have not been proven to actually fight terror, despite pushing the costs of remittances higher. They can also have severe humanitarian and economic impacts on a nation through the forced shutdown of the main remittance-providing firm, as occurred in Somalia after 9/11. The positive aspect of strengthened regulation includes the increased provision of information on remittance expenditures, which have become important in the analysis of the impacts of remittance flows.

Overall, the policies aimed at the prevention of terrorist financing and money laundering should not cease; rather, they should be effective so unnecessary costs are not borne by migrants. One of the most effective regulations includes a “know your customer” regulation. For example, this regulation would require the RSP to record individual transactions, the RSP to hold registration or licenses in many countries, and forbid the RSP from disbursing foreign currency. Through an international regulation requirement of these, an attempt would be made to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.

3. Encourage International Cooperation:
This economic downturn creates an importance for countries to come together in global cooperation to help each other through the crisis. The need in particular arises for developed nations to continue helping the developing due to the decrease in forecasts for remittance flows, private capital, and ODA.

The establishment of a “vulnerability fund” in which rich countries put aside 0.7% of the money earmarked for their own stability plans to avert dangers which could occur in developing countries represents an example of a globally cooperative policy. There are arguments against this, such as the usual criticisms of foreign aid and the chance that this money would be saved as a rainy day fund rather than spent. However, World Bank President Robert Zoellick feels these problems will not arise from the fund due to more awareness about the limitations of aid and the current heightened political sensitivity of the misuse of taxpayer money. The creation of safe and cheap remittance channels, especially in difficult to access rural areas, presents another way to spend this aid money.

Another global policy involves the international community creating a multilateral system that would decrease remittance costs and increase transparency for governments. While not necessarily applicable to the global economic crisis, this would take the burden off of institutions attempting to operate in poor countries and would thus prove beneficial in the short- and long-term.

4. Achieve Labor Integration:
Considering the past has demonstrated immigrants as ones hardest hit in recession, developed countries must increase efforts for labor integration. This will keep immigrants employed and thus sustain or increase current remittance flows.

One way to achieve labor integration involves the promotion of social mobility. This calls for the broad opening of job opportunities, thereby reducing immigrant disadvantages. Also, the creation of better educational and training programs tailored to the needs and cultural norms of immigrants remains crucial. This includes language learning due to the difficulty for immigrants to receive jobs when they do not know the language.

Job transitioning programs should also be created for immigrants by matching their skills and the chance that this money would be saved as a rainy day fund rather than spent. However, World Bank President Robert Zoellick feels these problems will not arise from the fund due to more awareness about the limitations of aid and the current heightened political sensitivity of the misuse of taxpayer money. The creation of safe and cheap remittance channels, especially in difficult to access rural areas, presents another way to spend this aid money.

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Considering the past has demonstrated immigrants as ones hardest hit in recession, developed countries must increase efforts for labor integration. This will keep immigrants employed and thus sustain or increase current remittance flows.

One way to achieve labor integration involves the promotion of social mobility. This calls for the broad opening of job opportunities, thereby reducing immigrant disadvantages. Also, the creation of better educational and training programs tailored to the needs and cultural norms of immigrants remains crucial. This includes language learning due to the difficulty for immigrants to receive jobs when they do not know the language.

Job transitioning programs should also be created for immigrants by matching their skills and the chance that this money would be saved as a rainy day fund rather than spent. However, World Bank President Robert Zoellick feels these problems will not arise from the fund due to more awareness about the limitations of aid and the current heightened political sensitivity of the misuse of taxpayer money. The creation of safe and cheap remittance channels, especially in difficult to access rural areas, presents another way to spend this aid money.

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and qualifications. This includes cooperation between sending and host countries in identifying for migrants job opportunities and migrant employment rights. The result will cover the reduction of ‘brain waste’ from immigrants earning less than natives with the same skills.21

Finally, developed countries must avoid the enactment of anti-protectionist labor policies since these protectionist policies lack an economic base when demand-driven immigrant labor exists. For example, according to the World Bank, native non-Hispanics have lost more jobs in the United States than foreign born Hispanic migrants. This represents the added value employers place on migrants.22 Without anti-protectionist labor policies, immigrants will be less likely to be fired and will thereby continue sending remittances.

Policies for Developing Countries

It has been empirically proven poor countries rely on remittances for development. Remittances raise income in developing countries, boost investment in human capital, and have spillover effects to non-migrant households.23 The decline in remittance inflows in the global economic downturn will decrease currencies, cause a downward pressure on wages from the return of migrants, increase unemployment, and put pressures on government budgets.24 The following policies specify ways in which developing countries can efficiently use remittances. For the most part, these policies have a medium- to long-term focus; however, the implementation of them now in this crisis proves fundamental.

1. Develop Use of Formal Remittance Channels:

The World Bank estimates that in 2008, remittance flows totaled $283 billion. However, the amount of remittances sent in informal channels, such as by a bus driver or friends, remains unknown. The reasons behind informal channel use include distrust in remittance services, lack of education about financial services, high costs to remit, and/or a lack of financial infrastructure.25

These informal channels do not create as large of a developmental impact because they have a smaller multiplier effect than bank deposits. This is due to the requirement of bank deposits for a deeper financial system, thus the availability of more resources to finance economic activities. More resources cause financial services to increase which then leads to an enhancement in living standards. Also, the use of bank deposits creates a need for innovative financial products developed specifically for migrants in order to maximize development.26

Surveys at points of entry or interviews with the Diaspora and households serve as methods to attain informal remittance data. The use of this information proves useful in improving remittance data, which can then be used to determine macroeconomic policy impacts for developing countries. For example, large inflows of remittances may change the foreign exchange rate or decrease export competitiveness. In this way, it remains important for developing countries, as well as developed countries and remittance providers, to seek ways of encouraging the formal use of remittance channels.27

2. Encourage HTAs:

Remittances have a transformative impact, particularly when used collectively in a large volume. Through collective use, remittances can play a role in lifting communities out of poverty, not just households. A beneficial avenue for this involves hometown associations (HTAs), which consist of organizations of migrants from the

22 Ozden and Schiff, 2006.
24 Ozden and Schiff, 2006
26 Martinez, Endo, Barberis, 2006.
27 Martinez, Endo, Barberis, 2006.
same town in their host country congregating for social and mutual aid purposes.  

In order for HTAs to flourish, migrants and families must have the ability to form organized groups, to identify appropriate projects, and then the coordination to carry them out. Governments in both the sending and receiving countries must also demonstrate leadership, encourage HTAs, and show support for initiatives. A program established by the Mexican government matching funds for every dollar raised by HTAs provides an example of governments and HTAs working together successfully. When local authorities in developed and developing countries create awareness of an existing HTA, developing countries can then attempt to channel remittance flows, which therefore will cause a larger multiplier effect to be felt by increasing access to the developmental impact of remittances.

3. Promote Financial and Migration Literacy:

As long as a wage gap exists between countries, people will migrate as they chase better opportunities and chances to help their homes, including by remitting. This incurs a need for the sending country to promote financial literacy in order to maximize the amount of remittances sent by emigrants. For example, the provision of information on different RSPs, such as how to access them, their prices, and their speed of services should occur. Details and contacts at NGOs willing to assist with migration and remittance efforts should also be provided.

All of these assume the sending country will realize the economic benefit of having citizens work abroad. For example, a ‘brain gain’ could result and outweigh a ‘brain drain’ when demand-driven migration exists. This ‘brain gain’ includes the benefits of remittances and investments, as well as new innovations and information brought home from abroad. Based off of these results, the encouragement of demand-driven migration by developing countries’ supply of information about migration opportunities remains crucial. For example, they can develop policies regulating overseas placements for migrant protection, provide information on visa and legal status requirements, and educate citizens on immigration laws and policies in destination countries. They can also create partnerships with companies abroad so emigrants have a job upon arrival. Therefore, through the realization of migration benefits, the capitalization of economic gains at home and remittance flows will result.

4. Improve Social, Political, and Economic Conditions:

Developing countries must create an environment through the improvement of social, political, and economic conditions in order to attract migrants to invest in their home country through remittances. Complex issues exist in developing countries, such as poor infrastructure, political corruption, financial instability and inflation. Weak infrastructures also persist, particularly in rural regions. These make it more difficult for remittance receivers to access remittances. Therefore, developing countries must strive to create an integrated macroeconomic approach strengthening local infrastructure and providing assistance to businesses.

Even though this concerns a long-term multifaceted issue with specifics largely out of scope of this paper, the recognition of the impact of social, political, and economic conditions on remittance flows remains important. General tools exist for public authorities to apply in these situations for more efficient use of remittance flows. They include more monitoring of the market, dialogue with the private sector, and communication and outreach to increase financial

28 Ozden and Schiff, 2006.
30 Haas, 2005.
31 Ozden and Schiff, 2006.
33 Haas, 2005.
35 Eversole, 2008.
literacy of remittances. The authorities must also act as a catalyst in the market, although regulation of authorities remains crucial to counteract market failures. The central bank may act as another good regulator in this circumstance.\textsuperscript{36} When a better environment exists in the sending country for investing remittances, migrants will send remittances through formal methods more willingly, the benefits of which were discussed above.\textsuperscript{37}

**Policies for Remittance Service Providers**

Remittance Service Providers play an essential role in the relationship between remittance flows and the development of countries because they channel remittances into local business development, as well as support the economic growth and sustainability of rural livelihoods. RSPs also gain through profit opportunities from providing remittances, such as fees charged, the provision of foreign exchange income, and the opportunity to cross-sell other financial products with higher margins, such as credit or debit cards.\textsuperscript{38} The following describe policies RSPs can enact in order to maximize economic gains through increased remittance flows.

1. **Increase Market Competition:**

The achievement of fair RSP competition allows for the reduction of remittance fees and makes services more accessible and innovative. This calls for the right balance of regulation since markets do not always function optimally, as seen in the current crisis. Therefore, the current situation represents an ideal time for the analysis of the efficiency of RSP regulations. If a lack of competitive market conditions exists, monopoly power prevails where choices become reduced and migrants face the charging of exorbitant remittance fees. This is further exacerbated when different fees are charged from the disbursing RSP and its agent, the amount of which remain dependent on their relationship.\textsuperscript{39}

The reduction in remittance fees as a result of competition will encourage remitters to shift from informal to formal channels, the benefit of which was discussed above. It will also have the more important benefit of increasing the disposable income of remitters, thereby encouraging them to remit large amounts of money at greater frequencies. For Sub-Saharan Africa alone, estimates of reducing remittance costs could raise $1 billion to $3 billion.\textsuperscript{40} Based off of these results, it becomes favorable for the RSP market to remain open and competitive.

2. **Support Financial Service Transparency:**

The remittance market must make the goal of ensuring transparency and providing consumer protection a priority. This includes transparency in the price and speed of services which will enable consumers to make informed decisions. It also includes the location where the remittance can be picked up and full knowledge of fees to be charged from the disbursing RSP and its agent. Transparency becomes especially important when immigrants do not understand the language well in their host country.\textsuperscript{41}

An avenue to achieve financial service transparency involves policy dialogue between public authorities and RSPs. Here the identification of issues of common interest and the removal of obstacles prove useful.\textsuperscript{42} Finally, as discussed previously, financial literacy by RSPs should be promoted and information made readily available. RSPs stand in a favorable position to assist in financial literacy since they serve as a liaison of remittances between


\textsuperscript{37} Haas, 2005.

\textsuperscript{38} Martinez, Endo, Barberis, 2006.


\textsuperscript{41} World Bank and Bank for International Settlements, 2007.

\textsuperscript{42} Martinez, Endo, Barberis, 2006.
developed and developing countries. Overall, the increased transparency of the remittance market allows for the capturing of more remittance flows.

3. Expand Financial Service Infrastructure and Remittance Services:
   As discussed above, the financial and physical infrastructure in developing countries may be underdeveloped. For example, extensive rural banking networks may not develop, a slow and unreliable domestic payment system may exist, and a lack of geographical coverage may occur. This means some areas may have limitations in their use of innovative remittance services, particularly if they do not have access to phone or Internet. This calls for a need for financial infrastructure so RSPs can expand to rural areas, perhaps through informal institutions such as cooperatives or credit unions.

   ATMs and mobile phones comprise the most successful remittance services. Therefore, it becomes problematic if the use of ATMs or mobile phones cannot be utilized by receivers of remittances due to a poor infrastructure. This occurs when, for example, mobile phones become subject to black spots and ATMs remain offline, decreasing the reliability of both. A weak infrastructure limits the use of ATMs and mobile phones to major towns only, thereby increasing the cost and decreasing the effectiveness of remittances.

   While this is a medium-term policy and therefore not necessarily applicable to the current economic crisis, it remains crucial for continuous improvement of the financial infrastructure in developing countries in order to allow remittance flows to achieve their maximum potential.

Preferred Policy Recommendation

In order for the impact of remittances to reach their full potential in developing countries, especially in the current economic crisis, there must be full cooperation between developed and developing countries, as well as RSPs. The achievement of this requires a combination of policies.

The most important policy to enact to save the remittances both today and for the future involves the examination of the remittance system. This also includes terrorist and money laundering regulations. Developed countries will hold the most influence in the overhaul of the remittance system. However, it also remains crucial for developing countries and RSPs to be active and have a say in the development of the new regulations. This way the remittance system will work as a whole. This holds particular importance since the international remittance system has three key players: developed countries, developing countries, and the RSPs. Furthermore, the most common scenario involves migrants working in developed countries where they use an RSP to send remittances home to their developing home country.

The new international remittance framework should focus on the efficiency of remittance flows. This will lead to financial transparency, increased RSP competition, and better infrastructure and financial services. Once a better system becomes developed, the promotion of financial literacy and a better investment of remittances will result. This is especially true since a reliable and transparent remittance system will make migrants more eager to remit through formal remittance channels with more developmental impacts. The latter also includes more awareness by migrants and their sending country of the developmental impact of collective remittance flows, such as through HTAs. This will thus cause an increase in the formation of HTAs in order to leverage remittance flows.

The review of the international remittance system can be started now during this crisis. Admittedly time must elapse in order to achieve a fully transparent and efficient system; it will not take place overnight. However, steps begun today will start the ball rolling. Also, further international cooperation can help buy time for now, such as the provision of aid to

44 Steinbäck, 2009.
45 Eversole, 2008.
When integration of all of these policies occurs, remittances will be saved and will thus have a global impact of assisting both the developed and developing world, as well as RSPs, through this financial crisis. An additional benefit will result through the provision of improved conditions for the future which can act as a safeguard against a similar situation in the future.

prevent developing countries from sliding too far backward. Also, while the unemployment of immigrants will undoubtedly occur, developed countries should nonetheless strive to achieve better labor integration. The most immediate step involves not enacting protectionist policies. If a demand for immigrant labor exists, regulations should not be in place maintaining employers must first attempt hiring natives. In this way immigrants will remain employed, thereby sustaining remittance flows.
Alternatives to Aerial Fumigation Policy

Along the Colombian-Ecuadorian Border
– Sarah Hulse-Reyes

Since the mid-seventies, the United States has implemented aerial fumigation policies worldwide in an effort to control the trade of illegal drugs, an initiative popularly known as the War on Drugs. In Latin America, aerial fumigation has been carried out in Mexico, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia with a varying degree of success. In Colombia, aerial fumigation first began during the Carter administration (1976-1980) to eradicate illicit drug crops in an effort to stop the flow of drugs into the United States. The illicit crops targeted by aerial eradication efforts in Colombia are coca, poppy and cannabis, or marijuana. Coca and poppy are processed into cocaine and heroin, respectively. Drug cartels in Colombia have greatly increased production of illicit drugs in the past few decades to make Colombia the world’s number one producer of coca leaf.1 The majority of Colombian illicit products enter the U.S. market, which undermine U.S. efforts to combat the War on Drugs domestically. However, aerial fumigation along the Colombian-Ecuadorian border is controversial in several aspects. Firstly, aerial fumigation along Colombia’s southern border results from a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Colombia; however, fumigants frequently cross the border into Ecuador, causing regional tension. Secondly, controversy over environmental and health safety concerns of glyphosate, the active ingredient in the agrochemical used in aerial fumigation, has cropped up repeatedly. Additionally, critics of U.S. antinarcotics policies indicate that a fumigation-centered focus does not fight the War on Drugs most effectively, but rather only a multi-faceted approach which will decrease the supply and demand of illicit drugs as well as alternative development programs in Colombia and transit countries will guarantee long-term success. Ultimately, Colombia’s unchanging capacity to cultivate coca and produce cocaine despite aerial fumigation efforts provides proof that alternatives to this policy need to be evaluated.

According to the CIA Factbook (2009), in 2007 Colombia had an estimated 167,000 hectares (ha) in coca cultivation, a 6% increase over 2006, with a potential of producing 535 metric tons of pure cocaine. The 2009 U.S. National Drug Control Strategy reflects the past administration’s plan which states that “disrupting the drug market at its source is at the core of the layered defense.”2 In other words, the U.S. focuses on the prevention of illicit drugs from entering the U.S. by removing the supply in the country in which it is provided. Aerial fumigation policy characterizes the key component of U.S. drug policy abroad. However, Sanho Tree, Drug Policy Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington D.C., says aerial fumigation is like “shoveling water” because


it is not producing the desired effects, but rather displacing rural families by eradicating their subsistence crops.3

In 2005, the CIA reported that over 130,000 ha were treated with aerial fumigation in Colombia, but admits that “aggressive replanting on the part of coca growers means Colombia remains a key producer.”4 It can be deduced from Figures 1 and 2 that Colombia has become much more efficient at producing cocaine as a decrease in hectares of coca cultivated has not impacted Colombia’s ability to produce large amounts of cocaine.

Multi-Faceted Approach

The multi-billion dollar per year revenue of the drug business allows for motility of operations when viability to cultivate, process, or transport in a particular area diminishes. This phenomenon has surfaced in Colombia. Due to aggressive antinarcotics policies in other countries, Colombian drug cartels have reaped great benefits as many drug operations, notably coca cultivation, have relocated to the fertile soils of southern Colombia. Current aerial fumigation policy relies heavily on the number of hectares of coca fumigated compared to local coca cultivation and cocaine processing.

Figure 1: Global Cocaine Production 1996 – 2006 (in metric tons) 5

However, to effectively rein in coca cultivation with the intent of decreasing overall supply of illicit drugs imported into the U.S., it is necessary to employ a multi-faceted program which will break the cycle of relocating cultivation practices by targeting more than one location and interdiction method at a time. Ultimately, coca cultivation will only cease once it is no longer profitable for local farmers to participate.

Figure 2. Coca cultivation in Colombia (ha), 1997 – 20076

4 CIA, 2009.
6 UNODC, Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region 2008.
Previous successful aerial fumigation operations in Mexico and Peru have led to the continuation of this practice by the U.S. government in Colombia. In the mid-seventies, fumigated cannabis crops in Mexico resulted in a temporary decrease in Mexican marijuana usage in the U.S. In the case of Peru, dramatic decreases in coca cultivation in the mid-nineties resulted from intense aerial fumigations. However, overall regional coca cultivation did not decrease, but rather relocated to Colombia.

Regional Strategies

Drug trade in Colombia has destabilized the country in recent decades. Therefore, the government of Colombia has allied with the United States to combat the War on Drugs within its borders as part of a national development strategy which intends to stabilize the country and ultimately satisfy the basic needs of all Colombian citizens. Aerial fumigation is a component of this plan as it is designed to reduce the supply of illicit crops by enforcing negative consequences for illicit drug producers. However, fumigation along the Colombian-Ecuadorian border has caused regional tensions as cross border drifts of sprayed agrochemicals allegedly have had negative impacts on human health and the environment in Ecuadorian communities. In March 2008, Ecuador took this concern to the United Nations International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Embassy of Ecuador reports that the suit was filed on the account of violation of Ecuadorian international sovereignty and "causing or allowing the deposit of toxic herbicides that have caused damage to human health, property, and the environment." To diffuse friction, Ecuador and Colombia must discuss mutually beneficial strategies to combat coca cultivation along the border and in the region.

Table 1. Coca Cultivation and Eradication in Colombia (1994 – 2000, hectares)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Coca Cultivation</th>
<th>Coca Sprayed</th>
<th>Coca Eradicated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>44,700</td>
<td>3,696</td>
<td>4,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>50,900</td>
<td>24,046</td>
<td>8,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>67,200</td>
<td>19,306</td>
<td>5,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>79,500</td>
<td>41,847</td>
<td>19,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>101,800</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>122,500</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


8 Concerns of using marijuana sprayed with the harmful chemical paraquat and an increase in U.S. production of marijuana are alleged reasons which caused a decrease in U.S. imports of Mexican marijuana (Tokatlian, 2003, p. 3). According to Tokatlian (2003), by the end of the seventies, marijuana imported from Mexico represented 10 percent of US consumption; however, by the mid-eighties this figure increased to 35 percent (Tokatlian, 2003, p. 3).

9 Prior to fumigation, Bolivia and Peru supplied Colombia with most of its coca paste, which was then processed, before being exported to the U.S.


13 ICJ suit filed on March 31, 2008: Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia).

Aerial Fumigation Awareness Campaigns

Awareness campaigns influence social behavior by increasing public knowledge of a particular situation. Awareness campaigns frequent public health and environmental arenas to highlight issues such as HIV/AIDS transmission, breast cancer risks, the harmful effects of cigarette smoking, and climate change. Goodwill ambassadors, often times celebrities, are involved in many social awareness campaigns. For example, Drew Barrymore is the Ambassador against Hunger for the World Food Programme and Angelina Jolie is the official Goodwill Ambassador for the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees. Furthermore, the popularity of awareness campaign use comes as a result of many studies showing their effectiveness to influence social behavior. A study published in the journal Marine Policy (2007), indicates that in recent years, consumer awareness campaigns have increased the level of ethical concern regarding seafood consumption as a result of distributing information to consumers in North America and Europe. More than half a billion dollars U.S. taxpayer dollars have been spent on aerial fumigation in Colombia. Additionally, there has been little research done to evaluate the level of contamination and harmful effects to the tropical Amazon basin brought about by aerial fumigation. Therefore, an awareness campaign which allows the U.S. public to better understand the use of public funds to fund aerial fumigation efforts may lead to more successful antinarcotics policies.

Promoting Food Security

Glyphosate non-selectively kills all plant life with which it comes into contact. Unfortunately, coca farmers hide their illicit crops amongst subsistence crops and in the jungle. This causes environmental and social degradation as efforts to eradicate coca fields often times result in subsistence crops and the jungle being directly fumigated or subject to agrochemical drifts. This begets an egregious cycle which causes the farmers to plant more coca in order to purchase food which was ruined by aerial eradication efforts. Increasing food security in these areas will therefore decrease the need for planting illicit crops. Hence, promoting food security along the Colombian-Ecuadorian border will take off financial pressures for families currently growing coca.

A study sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization (2000) reported that coca-growing areas have the highest infant mortality rates as a result of inadequate nutrition when compared to other rural and urban areas. Map 1 shows that the departments of Nariño and Putumayo have the majority of their populations living below the poverty line. Thus, food security of these populations is severely hindered by their inability to purchase much needed food and replace food crops destroyed by aerial fumigation. Efforts

17 Glyphosate affects the shikimate metabolic pathway common to all plants which gives its natural ability to kill virtually any plant with which it comes in contact. This has been deemed as a serious problem for the bio-diverse Amazon basin (Embassy of the Republic of Ecuador, 2008, p. 14). The shikimate metabolic pathway is not found in humans or animals and is one reason why glyphosate is considered fairly benign to humans when used as directed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (INL, 2007). However, the Grupo Interdisciplinario Político y Ambiente (2003) revealed that concentrations equivalent to 500 times greater dose recommended by Monsanto, the original patent holder of glyphosate, in accordance with EPA regulations is used (as cited in Vargas, 2005, p. 137).

18 WFP, 2009.


16 WFP, 2009
to identify food insecurity rates as well as initiating agricultural programs to increase the food supply need to be emplaced to ensure effective management of illicit crop cultivation.

Increased Access to Markets for Farmers Via Infrastructure Development and Microfinance Options

To effectively reduce coca cultivation along the Colombian-Ecuadorian border, infrastructure development must be one of the main priorities for the Colombian and U.S. governments. In his article "Prisoners of Geography" (2001), the director of the Center for International Development at Harvard University, Ricardo Hausmann, insists that "if small, rural communities in developing countries are to experience economic growth, it is crucial to connect them with the rest of their country and the world through investments in roads and other transportation infrastructure." Additionally, a study performed by the UNODC (2005) identifies the lack of market access as the primary rationale for rural farmers to avoid cultivating licit crops. (p. 12-3). Therefore, increased infrastructure development and micro-financing for local growers provide an opportunity for local farmers to take the first step toward a future independent of coca cultivation.


Rural farmers often times do not have roads to get their crops to markets. Therefore, after the efforts of traveling on non-navigable, or non-existent, roads, crops may not be suitable to sell at the market, or they do not fetch prices from which the farmer can subsist. On the other hand, hardy coca crops grow quickly and often times sold at the farm gate to middle men. Therefore, coca is a far more desirable crop for rural farmers. However, microfinance options for these poor farmers will give them financial security while they await harvest of licit crops. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) confirms that microfinance options are key components.

23 Coca has been reported to re-grow without replanting shortly after aerial fumigation destroyed the original field (WFP, 2009).
to fighting poverty in the developing world. Therefore, microfinance is an essential part of a successful economic development strategy along the Colombian-Ecuadorian border as farmers will be less apt to replant coca.

**Crop Substitution Programs (With a Transition Period)**

Crop substitution programs have been successful in many areas around the world, including the Andean region. In Peru, coffee and palm oil have helped nearly 7,000 families to earn enough money they could stop cultivating coca. Additionally, Colombia has seen a small amount of success as well with alternative crops. In 1993, the UNODC-founded Empresa Cooperativa del Sur del Cauca (COSURCA), organized 19 small-farmer producer groups in the southern province of Cauca to sell organic coffee and palm cabbage to European markets. By 2005, 1,500 families participated in this organization. Other crops proven successful in the Andean region include: cacao, rubber and peach palm. The UNODC (2005) reports that through crop substitution programs, agro-forest management programs have become successful in helping local residents become more aware of their environmental impact and earn money while doing it. This has influenced environmental policy in these countries as well. Therefore, crop substitution programs, which allow for a transition period to cultivate licit crops, are a way to give farmers opportunities other than growing coca as well as being more environmentally conscientious at the same time.

**Subsidies**

Sanho Tree of the Institute for Policy Studies warns that crop substitution plans have their limits as southern Colombia terrain is not conducive to transporting all tropical crops. Figure 3 exemplifies the countryside in the departments of Putumayo and Nariño whose southern borders are shared with Ecuador. As portrayed in this photo the landscapes are nearly vertical, and the lack of infrastructure makes transporting crops to markets relatively impossible.

**Figure 3. Coca Farmer Working in a Typical Landscape in Nariño, Colombia**

Due to the temporary cessation of aerial fumigation along the southern borders of the departments of Putumayo and Nariño in 2005-2006, coca cultivation has increased in these areas (see Table 2). As to not further strain regional relations with Ecuador, it is in Colombia’s best interest to find solutions other than fumigation along the border. One approach to deter coca cultivation in this area without using aerial fumigation would be to subsidize farmers along the border so that they are able to subsist without planting illicit crops. In the United States, often times farmers are paid to not grow crops as to not flood the market with one particular commodity. This keeps the market value of that commodity stable. This approach could be implemented along the Colombian-Ecuadorian border as an attractive alternative to growing coca for rural farmers.

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Table 2. Coca Cultivation in the Putumayo and Nariño, 2000-2006 (hectares)²⁸

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nariño</td>
<td>9,343</td>
<td>7,494</td>
<td>15,131</td>
<td>17,628</td>
<td>14,154</td>
<td>13,875</td>
<td>15,606</td>
<td>+20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putumayo</td>
<td>66,022</td>
<td>47,120</td>
<td>13,725</td>
<td>7,559</td>
<td>4,386</td>
<td>8,963</td>
<td>12,254</td>
<td>+37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75,365</td>
<td>54,614</td>
<td>28,856</td>
<td>25,187</td>
<td>18,540</td>
<td>22,838</td>
<td>27,860</td>
<td>+57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Trend</td>
<td>-28%</td>
<td>-47%</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>-26%</td>
<td>+23%</td>
<td>+22%</td>
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Capacity Building (Social and Economic Development Measures)

The U.S. antinarcotics policies heavily favor aerial eradication as the principle way to reduce the supply of drugs entering into the U.S. However, many critics argue that this negatively affects peasant farmers more than it does the drug supply. Sanho Tree confirms that without basic development, there is no way that the supply of drugs coming into the U.S. will decrease because “there are too many poor farmers and exhaustive amounts of land to grow the illicit crops.”²⁹ A U.S. focus on increased capacity building will better stop the supply of drugs coming into the U.S. as there will be alternatives to coca cultivation for farmers, thus curbing the illicit crop supply.

Capacity building not only allows for economic development, but also allows communities to realize their ability to produce change. A study evaluating the measurability and accountability of capacity building explains that, “capacity building aims to transform individuals from passive recipients of services to active participants in a process of community change.”³⁰ This fundamental quality of community participation is lacking in the rural areas. Therefore, through capacity building, a sense of community will evolve and initiate change.

Reducing Farm-Gate Value of Coca by Increasing Local Law Enforcement Interdiction

Beyond giving rural farmers the options of crop substitutions, subsidies, and economic and social development programs, reducing the farm-gate value of coca will in due course expedite the process of transitioning to alternative cash crops. The 2008 World Drug Report indicates that prices of coca paste at the farm-gate have increased in Colombia from US$ 853/kg in 2006 to US$ 946/kg in 2007.³¹ This increase in potential income will create resistance in desperately poor rural farmers to replace coca crops. Reducing the farm-gate value of coca by increasing local law enforcement interdiction will bear two fruits. Firstly, interdicting supplies used to make coca paste and other chemicals in the manufacturing of cocaine will limit unintentional consequences to peasant farmers seen with aerial eradication.³² Secondly, increasing local law enforcement will increase community involvement, thus reinforce the social fabric of the communities, a concept desirable from the capacity building programs. Additionally, increasing local law enforcement will extend the rule of law into these rural areas from which an environment for economic and political development can be created.

Conclusions/Policy Recommendation

Aerial fumigation successfully causes a short-lived decrease in localized illicit crop cultivation. However, the past 25 years of aerial fumigation policy proves that this policy does not sustain long-term effects, nor does it substantially

²⁸ Adapted Tables from, UNODC, Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region, 2007.
²⁹ Tree, 2009.
affect the global supply of illicit crops. Moreover, because of the capacity of the illicit drug business to relocate cultivation, aerial eradication negatively affects rural subsistence farmers, but not the illicit drug industry. Therefore, aerial fumigation does not effectively reduce the supply of illicit drugs entering into the U.S.

Policy recommendations include a multi-faceted approach in which crop substitution programs are reinforced with infrastructure development and microfinance options to reduce the need farmers have to grow coca and to increase access to competitive markets by: (1) reduce farm-gate prices of coca through local law enforcement interdiction of processing chemicals used to make coca paste and cocaine, (2) initiate crop substitution and subsidy programs to entice farmers to grow alternative cash crops, (3) increase local participation to extend the rule of law and increase capacity building efforts, (4) increase food security, and (5) address the need for regional strategies to reduce coca cultivation. It is also necessary to realize the importance of investing in research and sustainable development in order to better understand the long-term human health and environmental impacts of agrochemical use in the Amazon basin.

This multi-faceted approach matched with crop substitution and subsidy programs will give rural farmers the ability to choose viable alternative cash crops to generate income and thus improve food security in the area. Ultimately, the key to reducing coca cultivation along the Colombian-Ecuadorian border as well as the supply of illicit drugs coming into the U.S. is to promote social and economic development in rural areas. Therefore, combining the above recommendations and promoting regional alliances will increase the ability of policies to decrease coca cultivation along the Colombian-Ecuadorian boarder.
The Legal Status of the U.S. Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba

– Adam Sanchez

Introduction

The US naval base at Guantánamo Bay Cuba (Gitmo) is viewed by Cuba as a violation of sovereignty, and during the 1959-1992 periods a serious threat to national security. US authorities view the base as vital to security interests in the Caribbean, primarily in combating narco-trafficking and in the maintenance and training of the Atlantic Fleet.

Following the Spanish-American War, Cuba essentially became a protectorate of the US and later an addendum to the significantly US-influenced Cuban constitution, called the Platt Amendment, legalized US military intervention in Cuba “for the preservation of Cuban independence, and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty.” The terms of the Platt Amendment also required Cuba to “sell or lease to the United States, land necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be a-greed upon with the President of the United States.” Cubans condemned the Platt Amendment; the Constituent Assembly rejected it twice but as a result of US insistence, a third vote bound it to the Cuban Constitution of 1902. The 1903 treaty establishing the lease agreement of Guantánamo Bay gave the US “complete jurisdiction and control over the within said areas,” however, it also recognizes the “continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba” over the territory of the base.

In 1934, the two countries signed a friendship treaty, which included a provision stating that the 1903 lease agreement for coaling and naval stations would continue in effect until the two countries “…agree to the modification or abrogation…of the agreement…” According to the Department of State, this means the US presence at Guantánamo can only be terminated by mutual agreement or by US abandonment.

The new government under Fidel Castro in 1959 gave assurances it would respect all its treaty commitments, including the 1934 treaty covering the Guantánamo base. However, as US-Cuban relations have declined, the Cuban government has opposed the presence as illegal.

The provision outlined in the Cuban Liberty and

2 Ziegler, 93.
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 articulates that once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, US policy will be shifted to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba, or to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms. 6

Fidel Castro’s recent decline in health and in Cuban politics, the transfer of authority to his brother Raúl, and the anticipation of restored US-Cuban relations establish the context to review the Guantánamo Bay issue. Not only has this change brought new speculation to US-Cuba relations, but recent allegations of human rights abuses of the detainees held at the US detention facility at Guantánamo Bay have increased pressure to directly engage the debate. Recently, US President Barack Obama has ordered the closure of the detention facility, but nothing has been addressed concerning the future of the base. The issue of Guantánamo Bay needs to be comprehensively addressed. What follows are a series of solutions which coherently address the transnational problem at Guantánamo Bay.

**US Abandonment**

A recognition by US authorities that their occupation of Guantánamo Bay is no longer geo-strategically important and the subsequent abandonment of Guantánamo, would be the most straightforward and uncomplicated solution to the issue.

The desire to establish a base at Guantánamo Bay was primarily driven by a security perspective in creating a first line of defense against an attack on the Panamá Canal Zone. Acquiring a base at Guantánamo was also seen as securing control over the Gulf of Mexico and the countries and isthmus bordering it. 7 The Panamá Canal Renegotiations of 1977 reduced a key purpose of Guantánamo as protecting the Canal Zone, when President Jimmy Carter committed to return the canal to Panamá in 1978.

The “strategic” importance of Guantánamo for the US reached its peak during the Cold War (especially during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis), when it was feared Cuba would be used as a staging area for an invasion or attack on the US; however, in today’s political environment the current status of global geopolitics renders Guantánamo somewhat irrelevant. 8 Furthermore, analysts from the US and other countries suggest the bay has lost its usefulness and is vulnerable. 9

**The Legal Perspective: A Void Treaty**

Former U.N. lawyer and International Law professor Alfred de Zayas cites five international legal standards which make the 1903 lease agreement voidable. The Doctrine of Unequal Treaties illustrates the voiding of treaties which had been entered into between unequal parties, with specificity to imperialist powers imposing its will upon weaker states. Zayas argues Cuba was not fully sovereign in 1903 when the treaty was negotiated, and in the context of the Platt Amendment, Cuba was still under US military occupation when it declared its nominal independence on May 20, 1902. 10

The 1980 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties established the Emergence of New Peremptory Norms. Article 64 states if there is a new norm in international law, it retrospectively applies to all treaties. The principle of self-determination, and by extension a nation-state’s full sovereignty over its soil, has been a peremptory norm of international law for many years. The treaty between the US and Cuba without a doubt violates this norm.

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties articulates a treaty should be interpreted according to the context and the circumstances under which it was made. Zayas argues that Cuba intentionally did not sell the land to the US, but retained sovereignty over the leased territory. Therefore, “a sovereign should

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6 Sullivan, 39.
7 Ziegler, 89.
be able to regain the exercise of jurisdiction over territory in question; otherwise he is not a true sovereign." Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus provides the legal ground for a treaty to become invalid if there is a fundamental change in circumstances. The Cuban Revolution and the seizure of power by Fidel Castro and consequently the cutting off of diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba, clearly constitutes a fundamental change in circumstances.

The most obvious reason for invalidating the 1903 agreement, according to Zayas, is the breach of contract by the US. The treaty states the territory is to be used for “coaling or naval stations only, and for no other purpose.” The use of the base for establishing an internment camp and detention center is a breach of contract. The treaty also stipulates the base cannot be used for commercial purposes. There is currently commercial activity on the base (restaurants, bars etc.). Thus, US occupation of Gitmo violates international legal norms, which constitutes returning the base to Cuba.

The Example of the Panamá Canal Zone: A Timetable Withdrawal

In 1903, the US and Panamá entered into a treaty which gave the US rights to build, administer, and defend a canal cutting across the country and linking the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. The treaty gave US rights in the “canal zone” as if it were sovereign and “in perpetuity”. Domestic resentment for the level of US rights in Panamá led to pressures to renegotiate the treaty.

New negotiations resulted in President Jimmy Carter and Panamanian head of government General Omar Torrijos signing two treaties in September 1977. Under the Panama Canal Treaty, the US was to maintain responsibility of the operation, security and defense of the Canal until December 31, 1999. The Neutrality Treaty established the Canal to be open to ships of all nations, and the two countries would agree to uphold a regime of neutrality. US-Panamanian relations over the Canal following the renegotiation of the treaty, with the exception of the invasion of 1989, have seen significant cooperation over issues relating to the Canal. Five bi-national bodies to address issues such as defense affairs over the Canal were established, and between 1979 and 1985, sixteen joint military exercises involving US and Panamanian forces were conducted.

The Panama Canal Treaty ended on December 31, 1999, at which time the Panama Canal Commission (PCC), the US agency which operated the Canal, handed operations over to the Panama Canal Authority (ACP), the Panamanian agency established in 1997 to assume responsibility of Canal operations. Following the Panamá Canal model, the first step in the Guantánamo renegotiation process is establishing a timetable for withdrawal, coupled by coinciding bi-national operations (in the form of joint-military operations, and collaborative agencies of security, anti-drug, etc).

Renegotiate the Treaty

The US is currently and has throughout the history of the base violated the treaty. In 1991, Guantánamo accommodated large numbers of asylum seekers from Haiti. In 1994 and 1995 the base housed thousands of Cuban and Haitian migrants interdicted at sea by the US Coast Guard. Most recently, for which the Base has received an overwhelming amount of international attention and criticism, is the establishment of a detention center for terrorist suspects. The commercial activities on the base constitute the most obvious breach of the treaty, which clearly states the base cannot be used for commercial purposes.

Although Fidel Castro has not cashed a check since 1960, the amount of rent for the base should be renegotiated from the current amount of $4,085 (increased over the years from the original amount of $2,000). The US currently pays $17.4 million annually for the Air Force Base

11 COHA, “A Constructive Plot…”

in Kyrgyzstan. Since the Kyrgyzstan government announced the closure of the Manas Air Force Base in early February, the US has sought renegotiations but has also looked elsewhere to sustain NATO operations in Afghanistan. Renegotiating the annual rent of the base would enable Cuba to receive substantial amounts of money, while simultaneously avoiding the politics surrounding the Economic Embargo placed on Cuba by the US. A primary mission of the base has been to provide training to the crews of the ships assigned to the US Atlantic Fleet (Rennack 302). The new treaty should focus on ways to include Cuba’s military and implement joint training exercises, which will help reduce tensions as well as enhance cooperation, transparency, regional security and overall diplomatic relations.

Confidence Building Measures (CBM’s) in the 1990’s

The early 1990’s saw a shift in policy toward Cuba from US military commanders stemming from the fear of being drawn into a Cuban Civil War. As a result, the commander at Guantánamo initiated and established lines of communication which lead to enhanced cooperation between the two militaries concerning operations around Guantánamo. High-ranking US and Cuban military authorities continue to hold meetings every four to six weeks to address issues of common concern. Particular issues which solidified dialogue between the two nations are noteworthy: advanced notice of training exercises and plans to house fugitives (1999 Kosovo crisis) as well as terrorist detainees; cooperation over airspace, and the 1994 migration crisis. Although this “quiet diplomacy” based on military cooperation didn’t yield any formalized political agreements, US-Cuban cooperation significantly improved because of increased transparency.

The CBM’s should be used as the foundation to expand into a “transition phase” wherein the counterparts from Guantánamo including senior and junior officers and enlisted soldiers engage in planning and implementing operation orders, intelligence sharing, joint training exercises, joint security and anti-narco-trafficking patrols, and humanitarian missions. Furthering these CBM’s will enhance dialogue and the opportunity to establish formal political agreements whereby bi-national bodies can work together on training, security and drug trafficking.

Multi-Lateral Negotiations

Given the possibility the US may reestablish itself as a signatory to the charter of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the future, the ICJ offers a third party perspective on resolving the issue of Guantánamo. Chapter 2, Article 36 of the ICJ statute stipulates: “The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: the interpretation of a treaty; any question of international law; the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.”

The ICJ would provide a third party perspective on the Guantánamo issue. If the US and Cuba were to agree to a ruling offered by the ICJ, more than likely the base would be returned to Cuba on the basis of the previously mentioned international law standards. A second approach may be to request an advisory opinion of the ICJ through the UN on how to renegotiate the Guantánamo treaty within international legal norms.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Although US President Barack Obama has recently signed an executive order mandating the closure of the detention facility at Guantánamo,
there has been little indication to the future of the base itself. After 106 years of American occupation at Guantánamo Bay, a comprehensive renegotiation of the treaty, including a timetable for withdrawal, is essential for the normalization of US-Cuban relations. The best possible solution follows the model outlined within the treaty renegotiations of the Panama Canal Zone.

The Confidence Building Measures (CBM’s) experienced during the 1990’s can provide the foundation whereby US-Cuban relations may build a comprehensive dialogue which will lead to normalized relations, and more importantly, resolving the issue of Guantánamo Bay. Clearly, the increased communication, cooperation, and gestures of goodwill were indications of the desire by both countries to reduce tensions and avoid conflict. The CBM’s should be used as a basis for enhanced communication, collaboration and establishing bi-national bodies to oversee joint-training, security and issues such as narco-trafficking.

Expanding on the CBM’s of the 1990’s, and following the model of the Panama Canal Zone, the renegotiation process should consider a timetable for withdrawal; a review of the annual rent paid to Cuba until the set withdrawal date is reached; enhanced transparency over base operations, to include a gradual turnover of Guantánamo to coincide with the withdrawal timetable; and mechanisms to implement joint military exercises, including the establishment of bi-national bodies to work cooperatively on regional security issues, such as migration and narco-trafficking. This process of treaty renegotiation is the most viable solution whereby a timely, systematic, bi-lateral and diplomatic transition will restore full sovereignty and authority of Guantánamo Bay from US occupation to Cuban control.

A provision in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 states that once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, US policy is to be prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms. The turnover of the Cuban leadership from Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl has brought about much anticipation of the possibility of US desired change within Cuba. Ultimately, the issue of Guantánamo will remain, regardless of whether or not US desired changes occur within Cuba. Therefore, the issue of Guantánamo Bay should be pursued outside the parameters of speculated condition changes under Raúl Castro, and without a policy of preconditions by the US. However, these anticipations of change provide an opportunity for leaders of both countries to embrace a more cooperative and goal-orientated bilateral policy, rather than the ideologically-driven orientation that has dominated US-Cuba relations for decades. The first step in restoring US-Cuban relations is the renegotiation of the US Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay.

16 Sullivan, “Cuba” 38.
Abstract

It is undeniable that the development situations in post-colonial francophone Africa are among the worst in the world. Ethnic fragmentation, often accompanied by linguistic fragmentation, has created a situation in which, for many, there is little to no nationalistic sentiment associated with the state. Lack of community at a level beyond one's immediate surroundings acts as a hindrance to any attempts toward sustained development and solidarity on behalf of the state or international actors. As a result of perpetuated ethnic and linguistic division, larger development situations which affect every facet of the population have been allowed to continue, virtually unabated.

This work describes in detail the French-colonial impact on contemporary language, ethnic and development situations in Africa. It assesses current situations, creating a model which describes language as a function of ethnicity and relates linguistic/ethnic fragmentation to the development situations in many African states. It argues that language is an essential component of ethnicity and identifies ethnicity as a malleable construct. New constructs which transcend current ethnic boundaries may be created on the basis of shared language.

It argues that strong language policy, coupled with its fair and feasible implementation, has the potential to break ethnic barriers, to create nationalistic sentiment on a larger scale and thus to allow for more emphasis to be placed on solving the greater development situations facing the region. The driver of this potential is communication among groups who previously did not communicate or have historically been at odds with one another. The work briefly visits the potential for French as a driver of development in the region, ultimately concluding that while its merits are identifiable, on no certain terms is the colonial language the only option for Africa in its plight toward sustained development and solidarity.

The Colonial Experience: Human and Institutional Assimilation

Africa is arguably the least developed region of the world. Plagued with nearly every development conundrum imaginable, from AIDS to famine to lack of potable water, one cannot help but to ponder the historical roots of the mess with which it is faced. Within the context of francophone Africa, the common experience of colonization has undoubtedly played a role in the uneven development of the region. Each existing francophone state was subjected to colonization based largely on the same theory: assimilation into the French empire. From a retroactive perspective, the policy assimilation may be divided into two facets which were pursued to varying degrees; assimilation of peoples and
assimilation of institutions. When applied to the contemporary African situation, each played a crucial role in molding the development and ethnic complexities currently associated with the region.

Human Assimilation, Complexities and Favorites

The French historically pursued a colonial ideology wherein the peoples that they dominated were assimilated into French society as “Frenchmen” abroad. According to Jacques Stern, once French Minister of Colonies, assimilation was a process by which the French “consolidated the moral and material ties which bound together forty million Frenchmen and sixty million overseas Frenchmen, white and colored.”

The extent to which the African subjects were treated as proper “brothers” to the French, however, is debatable. While the French government proclaimed its dedication to creating a hundred million Frenchmen, it really only extended the assimilation process so far as to enhance the state’s interests abroad. This is to say that specific measures to ensure the equal treatment and consideration of the African populations as proper Frenchmen were never fully carried out. Contempt for the common African was an ever present sentiment among the French.

According to Martin Deming Lewis, author of “Assimilation” Theory in French Foreign Policy, “French critics of ‘assimilation’ base[d] their attack on the folly of extending European democratic institutions to the ‘inferior races’ comprising the populations of the colonies…” As a result, he asserts, “assimilation was preserved as a constitutional fiction, but no serious attempt was ever made to undertake the massive work of social transformation which could alone make it a reality.” The situation that soon arose was that of a small class of Gallicized Africans who were regarded as true Frenchmen to the detriment of all others.

The policy of assimilation only extended to the incorporation of a small class of elite Africans, often directly associated with already existing ethnic class makeup within certain realms of pre-colonial Africa, into actual French-colonial social and political structures. This elite group was used by the French as a tool of influence within the African context, as well as a driving force for the implementation of French policy abroad. Such elites were extended the opportunities to vote for members of French parliament and even to vie for positions in the body themselves. Only those Africans who were allowed to fully experience the assimilation process gained full access to the French language and culture.

Thus, the French colonial presence established long lasting ethnic and social divisions amongst the African populations. According to Constance G. Anthony in Africa’s Refugee Crisis: State Building in Historical Perspective, the colonial powers adopted a model of state building which “created an internal, administrative, ruling elite based on ethnic affiliation, allocated to that elite a disproportionate share of educational and economic resources, and then during decolonization designated a new political heir apparent.” Anthony’s assertion supports Egbe Ayuk’s premise that numerous inter-ethnic hostilities arose throughout the colonial period as specific individuals and ethnic groups were systematically favored by the French colonizers to the detriment of others.

The superficial nature of assimilation policy constructed a class structure which systematically favored traditional elites. French intentions to embrace the most privileged pre-colonial classes

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2 Lewis, 131.
3 Lewis, 150.
4 Lewis, 151.
5 Lewis, 150.
were made clear in its Cameroonian experience. According to Bernard Fonlon, in *The Language Problem in Cameroon: A Historical Perspective*, "the French zone [of Cameroon]... developed a well-organized, though very selective, educational system using French as the official language; the system utilized both government and mission resources and included further training in France." Those who were selected for its programs were largely sons of local chiefs and their kinfolk. This is reflective of the selectivism inherent to French colonial policy.

**Institutional Assimilation**

Institutionally speaking, assimilation inextricably tied virtually every facet of colonial African society to that of the French metropolis. It was a policy in which the French transferred physical military presence, French currency, culture, language, and to some extent, population to their African interests abroad. In consideration of France’s post-WWII future as an empire, the 1944 Brazzaville Conference’s final resolution declared that "...the aims of the work of colonization which France is pursuing in her colonies exclude any idea of autonomy and any possibility of development outside the French empire bloc; the attainment of self-government in the colonies even in the most distant future must be excluded."9

The case of Algeria is exemplary of French assimilation policy in the institutional context. In 1848, the French government declared Algeria part of France. According to Nadeau and Barlow in *Sixty Million Frenchmen Can’t Be Wrong*, "from then on, Algeria would not be administered by a single colonial ministry; each French ministry would be responsible for its own affairs in Algeria. The settlers elected their own representatives to the National Assembly and the laws of the Republic were applied there."10

On the whole, the ideology of complete administrative and institutional engulfment on behalf of the French was vehemently followed with few extractions from the empire, violent and messy where they occurred, until 1958. At this point, Charles De Gaulle extended the offer of full independence to any French African colony that wanted it. By 1960, nearly all colonial territories had seceded from the motherland.

Overall, since the earliest onset of French empirical expansion until its final days of colonization in 1960, assimilation laid the groundwork for perpetuated unilateral dependence on France as a mother country. By disallowing its “assimilated” peoples to fully integrate into its narrow spectrum of rule, it ill equipped its colonies to function independently in political, professional and economic realms; all of which are integral aspects of a fully functional independent state.

In theory, a fully assimilated colony could and would succeed as a fully independent state. It would possess an insider’s knowledge of the structure and functioning of a successful state. Nevertheless, since the elites were largely the only ones to actually integrate into the French way of life, they became the primary fluent speakers of the French language and propagators of the French culture and institutions.

Due to the colonial practice of favoritism, distinctions made in the colonial context perpetuated a division of peoples along class and ethnic lines. Selective assimilation in the human realm coupled with the colonies’ full economic and political “assimilation” mutually reinforces perpetuated dependence on France in a post-colonial world. Decolonization brought to the forefront of national conflict the interactions between the relatively integrated elite classes and the partly assimilated African masses; each fighting for a chance to rule a state that realistically lacked any real institutional, social or economic viability.
Centripetal Versus Centrifugal Binding Forces

During the colonial period, the common experience of subjection to French colonial policy found several groups of distinct peoples together within a specific space with demarcated boundaries that paid little regard to their relative social, cultural, linguistic and ethnic differences.11 Under colonization, ethnic groups that had historically been at odds with one another were commonly restricted to the proximity with their nemeses. Within this context, specific colonial administrative policies, including the political practice of favoritism and the varying degrees of the processes of human and institutional assimilation acted simultaneously as centripetal and centrifugal forces upon the African peoples. Artificial physical boundaries served as physical binding forces wherein varied sectors of the colonial society as a whole viewed the administrative superpower as a common enemy, due to common experiences with the same invasive and often brutal colonial policies which largely exacerbated pre-existing and class social structures.

In some cases, the common experience of life under colonial rule acted as a mechanism for uniting distinct ethnic groups, as the colonizers and acted as common enemies of ethnically and ideologically varied general populations. Although various facets of different colonial populations may have had different post-independence goals derived from distinct ideological underpinnings, the primary goal was often to first and foremost rid themselves of the perceived colonial burden. Goals beyond this primary principle were often secondary; at least until decolonization occurred.

The Algerian Case: Decolonization as cement; Independence as a Wrecking Ball

Within the case of Algeria, the multiple, often contradictory, levels of the French policy of assimilation may be readily identified. Careful examination of the Algerian plight for independence exemplifies the colonial experience as a temporary binding force among subject populations and the achievement of the common goal of statehood as catastrophic to the temporary unification. Coupled with a lack of institutional viability as an independent state, Algeria, like many post-colonial African states, had the groundwork for a legacy of dependence and internal turmoil set for them by way of French policy.

Overall, Algeria quite possibly exemplifies the bloodiest and messiest case of French colonialism. The French were present in Northern Africa for well over 100 years. As of 1954, France had transferred nearly one million Europeans to Algeria.12 Ethnically speaking, at the time, Algeria had a sizable Jewish population, as well as a substantial Muslim populace. Dorothy Good’s Notes on the Demography of Algeria reports that in 1954, 88.7% of Algeria’s then population of some 9.5 million were ethnically Muslim; the remainder were considered “non-Muslim” and consisted of French citizens, Jews, and non-Muslim aliens.13

Although it officially became a member of the French republic in 1848, extension of civil and political rights was not granted beyond the level of its one million European immigrants until much later. Thirty thousand Jews living in Algeria obtained equal civil and political rights as full members of the Republic in 1870; in 1889, the children of European immigrants (Pieds-Noirs) were granted French citizenship.14 French status was never granted to the indigènes musulmans (Muslim natives) in Algeria, as the Muslim faith was regarded as incompatible with French customs.15

In the broadest context, a sizable portion of the Algerian population, the Muslims, were systematically overlooked by the French. Over the course of the colonial period, only a few thousand Muslims were granted access to French

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12 Nadeau and Barlow, 104.
14 Nadeau and Barlow, 105.
15 Nadeau and Barlow, 105.
citizenship. By 1940, merely 8 percent of the native Muslims had formal educations. Overall, perpetuated alienation of this integral facet of the Algerian population gave rise to an independence movement initiated by the underclasses.

Over time, the Pieds-Noirs came to replace the European immigrants as the new elite class in Algeria. They were granted access to the French metropolis and enjoyed preferential treatment from the Republic. Small skirmishes between the Pieds-Noirs and the less favored masses, coupled with systematic negligence on behalf of the Republic allowed an independence movement which encompassed virtually the whole of the remainder of the populace, allowed a movement for autonomy to develop. At first, the struggle was for equal rights of the classes under French Republican rule. Due to a turbulent period in internal French political affairs, which resulted in roughly twenty regime changes in roughly twenty years between 1946 and 1948, the Algerian situation became of secondary importance. As a result, the roots of an Algerian independence movement were allowed to be planted among the disoriented and disengaged portions of the population.

Official movement for independence was initiated in 1954 when the Marxist Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) sect of the independence movement launched a string of guerilla attacks on both public and private sector French-led institutions. The war of independence lasted eight years. It exemplifies a temporary unification between distinct groups of peoples with varied negative experiences with colonial rule to meet the aims of asserting their presence and establishing a degree of autonomy. Diverse perspectives on the French and the extent to which their influence should remain in the region resulted in disagreement and infighting among the independence seekers, yet they still fought side by side in order to ensure that the French no longer could consume their distinct Algerian identity. In Sixty Million Frenchmen Can’t Be Wrong, Nadeau & Barlow paint the complex picture of the independence movement:

While they fought the enemy, both sides [of the French-Algerian war] had to deal with severe infighting in their ranks. The Marxist FLN was conducting a war against the French army, but also against the more moderate segments of the Muslim population who wanted to reach a peaceful agreement with the French and non-Marxist factions who were attempting to negotiate with the French government.

Overall, infighting throughout the independence era resulted as different factions of independence seekers struggled to address the question of who would go on to form the independent government. The FLN gained control of the Algerian state by way of the war for independence. However, to reach its independence aims, the group killed roughly 10,000 Muslims during the war and 30,000 traitors to the Muslim plight (those who fought as auxiliary soldiers on the side of the French) after independence had been achieved and the French had retreated from the land.

The Burden of Independence

In general, upon the departure of the French from direct control of a given area, established class structures and ethnic tensions within geographically defined boundaries remained, while the common goal of “independence” had been achieved, thus ridding the area of its common enemy and binding force. Subsequent ethnic hostilities and division of classes increase, as can be identified in the Algerian case. National governance becomes a power struggle amongst the more influential ethnic groups in a given region, wherein emerging leaders rally the support of their people in order to gain political office.

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16 Nadeau and Barlow, 105.
17 Nadeau and Barlow, 107.
18 Nadeau and Barlow, 106.
19 Nadeau and Barlow, 107.
20 Nadeau and Barlow, 107.
For those who do gain office, the colonial policy of favoritism manifests itself insofar as political leaders favor their people, their languages and their practices, along with those of their allies, to the detriment of others. Nepotism is prevalent. By way of this trend, strategic ties now associated with a quantifiable amount of direct power and influence over the new state's subjects and actions are consolidated and the seeds of perpetuated alienation of the masses sown.

In *History of West Africa*, Ajayi and Crowder describe the post-colonial elite classes as "educated at ‘assimilationist’ schools, employed by and large in the French administration, finding their parliamentary feet in the National Assembly of France and devotees of French culture."22 On the whole, insofar as the post-colonial political elite classes of the francophone world are concerned, France succeeded in transferring its political, social and cultural ideologies to its African counterparts. The lasting effect of this can be seen through the perspective of Wardhaugh, who contends that "even when the Negritude movement was created, it was concerned mostly with the celebration of African values within the French context rather than with the idea of independence." 23

The attachment of the new political leaders to the former colonial master, as fostered by their personal experiences with assimilation policy, unquestionably played a role in the shaping of the neo-colonial state. When related to French institutional assimilation, the plight of the neo-colonial state becomes increasingly clear. According to Donald Cruise O’Brien, "The [colony’s] poverty in resources, the lack of educated personnel resulting in dependence on French aid and administrative staff, and gerrymandering by the colonial administration all limited the political choices open to African political leaders."24 It is thus arguable that French influence over its former colonial territories was maintained, if not enhanced, as a result of decolonization.

Overall, the historical experience of French occupation has effects that can be identified in the present. Colonial boundaries continue to physically bind together groups that have historically been unbindable. The French common colonial policy of “assimilation” can be argued to have facilitated, if not created, the division of the African population along class lines, wherein true “assimilation” of France’s African colonies and the peoples within them happened only in the case of distinguished elites in specific societies in order to meet the end of propagating the French position on the world stage.

The Language Situation

Africa is a continent of nearly 700 million people, speaking about 2,000 indigenous languages.25 Nigeria alone has a population of nearly 100 million and a language base of over 400 dialects.26 Of language repertoires, it is not uncommon for an individual to possess productive competence in upwards of five languages. This competence is often regarded as essential as it is necessary for one to be able to communicate with whomever they may meet.

However, clear distinction must be made between productive competence and fluency. Often, a person is competent in the language of their local artisan, for example, insofar as they can barter the price of goods but cannot ask for the nearest food market because it would require a different vocabulary set. The result of this dichotomy is that people will develop different repertoires which reflect the various linguistic situations in which they find themselves on a daily basis. A schoolchild may use the colonial language in their studies, their mother tongue

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26 See Appendix A.
with their families and any of various other languages with their playmates, resulting in a basic competence in each language.

Within the context of the African experience, linguistic fragmentation can be said to relate directly to the ethnic divisions that existed in pre-colonial times. A stronger argument, however, affirms the relationship between language and ethnicity, drawing from the French-colonial experience in order to gain a fuller perspective on the language issue. At large, the French colonial policy of institutional assimilation brought the French language to the forefront of colonial affairs and effectively confounded the both the language and the ethnic situations faced by its subjects. Language and ethnicity are functions of one another; together, discontinuities act as a hindrance to sustained development and solidarity in the region.

Language & Ethnicity in Development

"Ethnicity is more than skin color or physical characteristics, more than language, song, and dance. It is the embodiment of values, institutions, and patterns of behavior, a composite whole representing a people's historical experience, aspirations, and world view. Deprive a people of their ethnicity, their culture, and you deprive them of their sense of direction or purpose."  

Ethnic fragmentation, along with the language fragmentation that it facilitates, is an obvious detriment to the forging of a nationalistic identity associated with the modern state and its geographic boundaries. It is arguable that national identity associated with the state is a crucial factor in fostering human development. For the purpose of clarity, association of nationality with the state does not imply the association of nationality with the governing body. Rather, it is merely an attempt to reach beyond individual communities in order to foster positive relations and solidarity among people of distinct ethnicities to work toward a better development situation for all. According to Egbe Ayuk, "national development is concerned with all aspects of nation-building such as: growth in human welfare, economy, politics, culture, social life and education," all of which depend on effectual language policy.

Thus, language is a key factor in economic, social and cultural development. Whether arguing for Pidgin English in Cameroon, Afrikaans in South Africa, English in Kenya or any other language in any given African state, there is a general consensus among scholars that there is no effective development without education and no effective education without language.

Therefore, common language can be an extremely useful mechanism by which to support nationalism and to further promote efforts toward sustainable development and solidarity.

Common language plays a crucial role in the relative successes of nation building efforts, as well as efforts toward the forging of a common cultural identity. Language and ethnicity have in the past been used as mechanisms by which one class, tribe or segment of society manipulates and gains power in place of another. Language differences facilitate the perpetuation of historical ethnic boundaries because limited communication amongst groups allows distinct groups to limit interethnic interaction.

This limited interaction becomes problematic within the modern state system under which all Africans find themselves. In this context, "modern state system" refers to the state system under which the international community operates, which recognizes states as sovereign bodies. Nations within states, no matter how diverse or whether their people have come to be citizens of a given state by choice or coercion are subjects of the state within its demarcated boundaries. Thus, in a modern state where peoples within its borders must answer to a central governing body, no matter the nature of the political entity,

lack of communication facilitates systematic
disclosure of certain portions of the population in
the political, economic, cultural and social realms
of society.

Within the neo-colonial context, those who
will find themselves at the heads of states will
be the elite Gallicized classes who operate
under the French terms with which they have
become inextricably linked. Thus, a state will
often be comprised of a white collar urban core
which operates primarily in French and a blue
collar rural periphery with a wide range of
language repertoires.

Beyond Ethnic Barriers:
A Community Imagined

Language and ethnicity are not mutually
exclusive concepts. Due to the subjective nature
of the construct of "ethnicity", language may be
divorced from ethnicity by way of the promotion
of a common language within a state structure.
According to Abiero Opondo, ethnicity "refers
to a shared cultural identity, involving similar
practices; initiations, beliefs and linguistic
features passed over from one generation to
another."30 Defined in this way, ethnicity may
be viewed as a less rigid construct with inherent
fluidity.

According to the Constructionalist theory of
ethnicity, "ethnicity" is not free of manipulation.
Rather, it is a constructed identity wherein
imagined communities exist and are potentially
in a constant state of change. It is a flexible
social identity with strategic quality that is
conceptualized under specific historical-
political circumstances. Historically speaking,
"ethnic nationalism" has been an exclusivist
and isolationist construct. According to Abiero
Opondo, ""ethnic nationalism" is some kind of
biological organism, based on real or mythical
common descent, purity of race, sovereignty,
language and culture and declaration of an
exclusive zone for 'us' and not 'them.'"31

Thus, based on the assumptions of
Constructionalist Theory, "ethnic conflict" may
exist between people of a common descent, but
of different classes. This is the case between the
Hutu and Tutsi clans in Uganda and Rwanda. Both
clans were at one point ethnic Banyamalenges.
Scientifically speaking, they descend from the
same group of peoples. The distinguishing factor
between the two is that the Tutsi group was the
favorite of the Belgian colonizers. According to
Constance G. Anthony, author of Africa's Refugee
Crisis: State Building in Colonial Perspective:

In Rwanda and Burundi, the Belgians,
like their colonial predecessors the
Germans, were much impressed with
the Tutsis. This was the case in part
because of the height and physical
grace of the people and in part because
of their semi-feudal relationship with
the Hutu. Both European powers found
the political culture of the Tutsi to
echo that of their own upper classes.32

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A second tenet of Constructionalist Theory
holds that ethnicity only exists in the plural, in
the relationship of 'us' and 'others.'33 Thus, what
happens to one ethnic group does so to the
detriment of another, especially when group A is
at odds with group B. Furthermore, elites within
prosperous, linguistically homogenous regions
will be vehemently opposed to the naming of a
language distinct from their own as the state's
official national language.34

Although language is not the sole basis for the
identification of ethnicity, it is a driving factor of

30 Abiero Opondo, Ethnicity: A Cause of Political
32 Anthony, 581.
33 Carola Lentz, "‘Tribalism’ and ethnicity in
Africa: A review of four decades of anglophone
34 David D Laitin, Language Repertoires and
State Construction in Africa, (New York:
the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy. Left unabated, ethnicity in its class manifestation could potentially result in a situation not dissimilar to that of the Hutu and Tutsi, wherein the French speaking urban elite created an exclusive ethnicity for themselves. Such ethnic constructs have devastating effects on the remainder of the populations within any given state.

Conversely, the promotion of a common language associated with the state contains the potential to forge some sort of national identity between a people and its country. In the positive, ethnicity can be a binding force which brings together diverse groups for the greater common goal of sustained development and solidarity. However, in order for ethnicity to take on any sort of positive imagery, the current ethnic structures that exist within a given state must be manipulated. A new imagined community based on identifiable commonalities amongst inherently diverse groups must be created. Common language, coupled with a cultural emphasis on other notably African experiences, can facilitate this creation.

The idea that ethnic barriers within states hamper national unity is not lost upon contemporary African leaders. The ethnicity issue has been addressed to varying degrees and ends within post-colonial Africa since independence. According to Francis M. Deng in *Ethnicity: An African Predicament*, “In most African countries, the determination to preserve national unity following independence provided the motivation behind one-party rule, excessive centralization of power, oppressive authoritarian regimes, and systematic violation of human rights and fundamental liberties.”35 Although true in many cases, specific leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, Jommo Kenyatta of Kenya and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania all took on proactive approaches toward the fostering of national unity which transcends ethnic boundaries.36

While it operated within the one party context that Deng alludes to, the case of Nyerere’s Tanzania is of specific concern to the argument that language is a key factor of nationalism and a key function of ethnicity. It is an example of a movement toward nationality spearheaded by a charismatic leader with the specific intent of uniting his peoples. According to Deng, “Julius Nyerere, a scion of tribal chieftaincy, stamped out tribalism by fostering nationalistic pride in Tanganyika and later, Tanzania, born out of the union with Zanzibar.”37 At large, the relative success of Dr. Nyerere’s developmental undertaking was a direct result of his promotion of Kiswahili as a national language.

Former English colonies, Tanganyika and Zanzibar came together as independent Tanzania in 1964. Dr. Nyerere was the republic’s first post independence political leader. Ethnically speaking, the state is 95% Bantu, made up of over 130 tribes.38 Its religious breakdown is roughly one third Christian, one third Muslim and one third “indigenous beliefs”. Its official languages are Kiswahili (or Swahili) and English. A large portion of the population speaks Arabic. Much of the population speaks an indigenous language as their first.

Himself ethnically Bantu and a speaker of Kiswahili, Dr. Nyerere saw specific potential in his language as a means by which to promote development and solidarity within his nation. Dr. Nyerere played an active role in the movement toward Tanzanian independence, yet never prescribed to complete rejection of the English language and culture reminiscent of the colonial era. In his final address as president of Tanzania, Dr. Nyerere acknowledged that his presidential policies were not without shortcomings, but asserted that “making Kiswahili Tanzania’s language helped us greatly in the battle against tribalism.”39 He further declared that, “if every Tanzanian had stuck to using his tribal language

39 Laitin, 92.
or if we had tried to make English the [only] official language of Tanzania, I am pretty sure that we would not have created the national unity we currently enjoy.”

Dr. Nyerere recognized that linguistic fragmentation acts as fuel on the fire of ethnic division. He acknowledged the potential dangers of perpetuated ethnic division and strived to transcend the historical boundaries that divided his people. However, his approach remained centered. This is to say that although the government’s policy did not promote the colonial language, it also did not abhor it. It drew upon the unique historical experience of Tanzania with regard to linguistic, religious and ethnic breakdowns as well as the colonial experience and conceptualized a policy that could create a sense of community with the country as a whole. According to Lyndon Harries in Language Policy in Tanzania, Swahili functions within Tanzania as not only as an expression of Islamic culture and a lingua franca, but also an “expression of a newly created African culture…[and] an important medium for achieving the new culture.” He further asserts that “at present this evolving culture is not subject to easy definition. There are so many sectors of the national life involved in its creation, and at so many different levels, that it is merely speculation to suggest what precisely will be the African elements that will comprise the culture.”

Overall, the linguistic aspect of Dr. Nyerere’s nation building model was not without faults. Specifically, there are ethnic hostilities toward the Chagga and Haya groups within the country, as they are seen as having more access to educational and economic opportunities. By and large, however, Kiswahili arguably does not suggest favoritism toward a large or powerful ethnic group; a fact that contributes greatly to its acceptance on behalf of the Tanzanian population. The language policy which embraces Kiswahili also does not reject, but acknowledges the potential benefits of bi/multilingualism with regard to both English and vernacular languages. On the whole, Tanzania’s language policy, affronted by Dr. Nyerere, is exemplary of the potential for ethnic harmonization by way of effective language policy which emphasizes common language as a mechanism by which to promote sustained development and solidarity.

Defining a ‘Common’ Language

Extreme care must be taken, however, in choosing a language to promote as “common”, so as not to alienate large portions of a state’s population. Complex issues associated with the consequences of ethnic constructs have historically compounded the issue of selecting specific languages for use on a statewide scale. Bernard Fonlon precisely expresses this language complex in the following excerpt from The Language Problem in Cameroon: A Historical Perspective:

In Africa, partly due to the failure of the great African empires to consolidate themselves and expand and endure, partly due to the constant movement of peoples, and most especially, to four centuries of the ravages of slave raiding and trafficking, no African languages, with the possible exceptions of Arabic and Swahili, have been able to impose themselves as dominant media of wider expression.

Due to the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ structure under which a large portion of ethnic groups operate, it is often perceived that what happens to one group does so to the detriment of another. Thus, adopting a language policy that favors one group over another, whether implicitly or explicitly, could aid in the unequal development of a society. Thus, the question of which language(s) to advocate must be carefully considered, so as to house the least potential for compounding ethnic discontinuities. This becomes difficult due to the psychological nature of language.

40 Laitin, 92.
42 Harries, 276.
43 Bentsi-Enchill and Smock, 220.
44 Bentsi-Enchill and Smock, 190.
and its role in ethic construction. According to Robert Armstrong, once director of the Institute for African Studies at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria:

In the great area between Yaoundé... and Dakar... from 500 to 1,000 different languages are spoken... These languages are important to the people who speak them and who, speaking them, become complete human beings. So important, indeed, are their respective languages that people make them the very symbol and banner of the cultural and tribal differences that today rack Africa... Thus it is obvious that when we discuss language problems of developing nations, we are not merely discussing cabinet and ministry decisions, the recommendations of international conferences, the statistics of examination results, and the experience of pilot teaching projects. People still kill each other over language questions.45

Unsuccessful language policies can lead states down destructive paths with regard to solidarity and development. Where mishandled, language policy alienates the masses and leads to a more deeply seeded ethnic divide.

Unsuccessful Language Policy: Cameroon

The contemporary language situation in Cameroon is exemplary of the disastrous and dividing effects that an unsound language policy may have on national populations. Currently, the nation adheres to an official policy of bilingualism. English and French are both official languages. Multilingual policies are a concrete way to engage significantly larger portions of a state population without advocating one language to the expense of all others. In theory, multilingual policies are a viable alternative to single-language policies which can still work toward the goal of ethnic harmony. However, in Cameroon, the theoretical bi-lingual situation in no real terms translates to the practical.

Apart from the fact that the policy has inherent flaws in not accounting for Pidgin English, the hybrid language of many Cameroonians, its practical application is still not conducive to formulating an engaged, harmonious state population. While Cameroon has made strides to protect and promote their bilingual English/French policy structure, most projects have seen a lack of follow-through which has proven to be disastrous to the vision of unity sought after by the original propagators of bilingual language policy.

The Cameroon Tribune hails early attempts to create a bi-lingual society, stating that “early initiatives, such as the creation of a government bilingual college in Man O’war bay... in 1963 and the subsequent opening of a similar institution in Yaounde in 1967 laid a solid groundwork for the formal implantation of bilingualism in our country.”46 Mr. William Eteki Mboumoua, former Federal Minister of Education in Cameroon describes the vision of the institutions as: having Cameroonians of the two sides of the Mungo study side by side, living in the same dormitories, playing in the same teams, writing the same examinations and so forth.”47 However, the result was that after the initial set of students the schools produced, unity waned. Eteki Mboumoua attributes this to a lack of follow through.

Beyond lack of follow through to fully promote bilingualism, government actions which systematically favor one official language over another further exacerbate the issue. According to the Cameroon Tribune, “government texts continue to be published in one official language to the detriment of the other.”48 The favored language is French. Here, as in much of the rest of Africa, the French-speaking population is the elite class.

45 Laitin, 50 (emphasis added).

46 "Bilingualism - Where There's the Will,” Cameroon Tribune [Yaounde], (30 Jan 2008 Web), 1.

47 "Bilingualism - Where There's the Will,” 1.

48 "Bilingualism - Where There's the Will,” 1.
Thus, where French is systematically favored in government, the pre-existing class structure, based heavily in the colonial experience, is perpetuated. Whatever language happens to be the subject of the policy at hand and whether or not it is unilingual, the principle that unsound language policy facilitates ethnic disintegration remains. If there is no follow through on projects and no quantifiable will on behalf of the state’s political administration to promote a unified people, the policy will be ineffectual, resulting in further alienation of the masses, less ethnic cohesion and less development within the state.

French as a Common Denominator?

For the majority of post-colonial Africa, there is a common linguistic denominator which, where employed carefully and systematically, could forge linguistic unity within specific states. This language is French. French is an official language in twenty three of the continent’s states.49

The French undeniably played a role in the formulation of the social structures that are currently present in the region. It undoubtedly favored high standing indigenous elites, creating and consolidating a class structure based around the white collar urban elite which extends to the present. It created the common history from which new imagined communities may be created. Its negative effects are innumerable. On the other hand, it endowed the region with a legacy of French interest in its internal and external well being and a mechanism for upward mobility on the international stage.

The potential usefulness of French as a mechanism by which to promote sustained development and solidarity must not be overshadowed by its less than positive colonial impact on the region. It does have potential for having a positive impact in the region. However, in order to do so, utilizing the French language must be re-contextualized not as a reflection of adherence to colonial/imperial dominance, but as an aspect of a shared historical legacy which was overcome by a united people under a common goal. Overall, it, along with its imperialist owners, must be seen in the eyes of the African public as a tool that can be used to the advantage of the African region and its peoples.

French as a Tool for Upward Mobility

It is arguable that the French language can be an extremely effective mechanism by which to promote efforts toward sustainable development and solidarity within francophone Africa. First and foremost, as a colonial legacy, French is already widely spoken and understood within the region. It is a highly developed language that is readily made use of in texts, literature and art. Many institutions with capacities to help to provide the African people with sustainable development projects, such as the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) are not from within the region. Finally, common knowledge of the French language could enhance the potential for upward mobility for both individuals within the states in question, as well as for African states on the international scene.

It is undeniable that French is among the most developed languages in the world. It was once the language of international diplomacy. Its rules are defined and it is widely published. Textbooks are readily available in the language. Insofar as education is concerned, French is a theoretically viable alternative. Its developed status can serve as a standard for education, allowing African students a relatively equal form of education. Margaret Jepkirui Muthwii asserts that in the past, the colonial language has been favored because it "already had a standardized orthography and could be used right away, instead of awaiting the development of the orthographies of the Indigenous languages."50 Overall, promoting French in the context of education can ease the burden of deciding upon a language to use in the classroom. French can also foster ties


between varied groups across borders within Africa and without, allowing for the international community to take more notice of Africa and its development complexities.

Within Francophone Africa, command of the French language is often associated with elite status. It is a contemporary reality in a number of former French colonies that a sufficient grasp of the French language is a driver of social mobilization. Muthwii further asserts that in the past, the colonial language has "offered a unifying force in multilingual and multicultural setting of most African countries, and they paved the way for African countries to be part of the international world." 51 This is to say that in principle, knowledge of French may gain a person access to white collar jobs in an urban environment as opposed to blue collar jobs confined to the rural periphery. Further, language as a driver of mobilization may be extended beyond the scale of individuals in society. On an international level, command of a language recognized as influential at the international level can bring Africa, thus individual Africans, from the blue collar periphery of the world into its white collar urban core, increasing its voice on the world stage.

Command of the French language fosters closer ties between France and its former colonies. In a 2008 interview with BBC Monitoring Africa, Malagasy president Marc Ravalomanana asserted that "there are many people in Madagascar who speak French and we will take advantage of that to develop our country. French and English are languages for communication. It is results that count... if Madagascar advances, France will be proud" and further that "the members of the Francophonie are going to reinforce the French language." 52 If Ravalomanana’s attitude is at all reflective of at least a portion of the African population, it is clear that the idea that the French language acts as a link from Africa to France and the rest of the world by extension, is a contemporary reality. 53

A French only Africa is not, nor it should be, the goal of promoting French in the region. The benefits associated with utilizing French as a subject of sound language policy are met with numerous difficulties and much disagreement which may be attributed to the heterogeneity among different states and peoples and their experiences of French colonialism/imperialism. As with any subject of language policy, some areas may require a policy of bi or multilingualism in order to minimize the alienating effect of a foreign language policy on specific populations.

Standard language policies must not be forced upon populations. Although French can facilitate communication and development, so too may many other languages. It is important that the subjects of the policies in question view the language of their land in a positive manner. Overall, the transformation of specific African states into French speakers must be done on African terms. Any policy centered upon the promotion of the French language must not attempt to be overarching and must account for heterogeneity among people subject to the policies.

Sound language policies created by state governments, which recognize the potential of French for sustained development but do not overlook the importance of indigenous and other languages in nation building and national/cultural identity, can be of immense aid to development efforts in the region. On no certain terms is French the only option for the region. If states see the benefits of French language policy to be in the best interests of their people, a policy which treads lightly upon the emotional aspects associated with class, language and ethnicity.

Conclusions

It can be argued that language and ethnicity in the African context are inextricably linked. While ethnic and linguistic fragmentations

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51 Muthwii and Kioko, 98.
52 Marc Ravalomanana, BBC Monitoring Africa [20 Oct 2008], Interview.
53 Lazare Ki-Zerbo, Personal interview (14 October 2008). Interview.
are detrimental to the forging of sustained development and solidarity, it is imperative to find creative mechanisms by which to overcome these issues. As ethnicity may be contextualized as a malleable construct based on perceptions of shared histories, common languages, values and institutions, it is thus imperative to construct new ethnicities associated with the contemporary state. This would ideally allow populations to focus more closely on the greater development problems facing their people, as facilitated by a state government free of nepotism and favoritism among its people.

When looking at forging new ties amongst varied peoples, it is imperative that a common denominator upon which to build solidarity be identified. In this case, the common experience of colonization on behalf of the French may be this base. If the colonial experience were to be recontextualized as a shared history, from which there were no real winners, populations could come together as one for the purpose of promoting a common plight toward complete independence and a higher level of development.

Common language is a root of solidarity in that everything from basic education to political administration at the highest level depends on effective communication. Thus, effective language policy is a key factor in creating new imagined communities. There is good language policy and bad language policy; both of which may be exemplified as to identify language as a key to ethnic cohesion. In Tanzania, Kiswahili binds historically unbindable people. In Cameroon, French language policy deeply ingrains sharp divisions of classes into everyday life and leaves little space for solidarity and further development.

Basing a movement toward ethnic defragmentation upon the common historical experience of colonization coupled with a common language to facilitate communication may be the most effective way to promote solidarity and sustained development in the region. That language can but does not have to be French. Where there is no discernable stakeholder who stands to gain notably more than other involved parties, French may be an option. However, in most cases, there will be an alternate language or which is better suited to work to the advantage of the homogenous masses within any given state.
Abstract

In this paper I will present the Commonwealth of Nations, the previous British Empire organization, and the International Organization of the Francophonie, which is inherently linked to the French colonial past. I will specifically research the organizations’ connections to language, their mission statements, past missions, and critiques involved with these organizations. I will then present three countries as case studies: Cambodia, previously a French colony and currently a member of La Francophonie; Fiji, a former British protectorate and a suspended member of the Commonwealth of Nations; and Vanuatu, which was jointly colonized by the British and French and is respectively a member of both organizations. Each case study will involve a description of their colonial and post-colonial histories and effects on their current situations. Finally, I will determine whether organizations like the OIF and CON have the capacity and opportunity to benefit a member country. Nevertheless, it is up to the member state to understand the inherent qualities of these organizations and to attribute them to a relationship that mutually benefits both parties involved.

The Commonwealth of Nations

The Commonwealth of Nations is a voluntary association of independent sovereign states, each responsible for its own policies, consulting and cooperating in the common interests of their peoples and in the promotion of international understanding and world peace.¹

The approaches of the Commonwealth of Nations (CON) and the International Organization of the Francophonie (OIF) are different, due to their creation histories, both in origin and function today. James Mayall, author of ‘Democratizing the Commonwealth’ featured in the International Affairs Journal states his concept of the beginnings of the organization as stated in this passage.

The Commonwealth has no functional, economic, regional or even political rationale. It grew with the disintegration of the British Empire, transforming itself in the process from an association of white dominions sharing the same monarch into a multinational, multi-cultural and multi-religious association...²

This transformation was molded by the Harare Declaration of 1991, which aided the Commonwealth in becoming an organization that

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works towards democracy, good governance and for the promotion of sustainable development. The Commonwealth outlines their three main missions as: a force for peace, democracy, equality and good governance; a catalyst for global consensus building; and a source of assistance for sustainable development and poverty eradication. The organization functions as a networking device for both voluntary and professional associations to organize and mobilize for the benefit of member states.

A Force for Peace, Democracy, Equality and Good Governance

The Commonwealth Foundation is an intergovernmental organization that was created by the Heads of Governments of the Commonwealth of Nations in 1965. It is funded by, reports to and follows the beliefs and mandates of the Commonwealth of Nations. Its specific goals are to work with members of the Commonwealth of Nations and to follow the organization’s mandate.

Our mandate is to strengthen civil society in the achievement of Commonwealth priorities—democracy and good governance, respect for human rights and gender equality, poverty eradication and sustainable, people-centered development, and to promote arts and culture.3

The aims of this mandate are to facilitate communication via conferences, seminars and workshops; to aid the exchange of information between professional and other non-governmental organizations; and to help implement any other activities as given by the Commonwealth of Nations.

There are four sectors of the Commonwealth Foundation that function as its empirical means: the Governance and Democracy Programme, Human Development, Culture, Communities and Livelihoods. The Governance and Democracy Programme focuses on giving opportunities for civil society leaders to speak directly to their governments through ministerial meetings. It also promotes learning and understanding between communities through workshops and toolkits. On a more political level, this sector works to form new government policies as a reflection of good governance and democracy. The Human Development sector concentrates on the eradication of HIV/AIDS; gender equality in access to education; and climate change and disaster risk management and mitigation. The Commonwealth Foundation uses their Culture sub-section to help with ‘cultural practitioners’4 to make an adequate living from their work. They work not only on the local level, but also with policy making by improving the working environment for practitioners. Finally, Communities and Livelihoods is a program that emphasizes environmental services and renewable natural resources in coordination with sustainable development. These four programs under the Commonwealth Foundation all facilitate action of the Commonwealth of Nations mandate of peace, democracy, equality and good governance.

A Catalyst for Global Consensus Building

The Commonwealth Secretariat structure is the main tool that the Commonwealth of Nations uses in order to bring its members together to work on collaborative beneficial projects. Under the Commonwealth’s Secretary-General Office and its Deputy Secretary-Generals are a vast amount of programs ranging from human rights to social transformation. The Secretary-General’s office contains a communications and public affairs division, covering press and media relations, website management, and public affairs. In addition, it contains a division for strategic planning and evaluation of civil societies within the Commonwealth of Nations.

Both Deputy Secretary-Generals have their own programs to manage and implement.


4 ‘Cultural Practitioners’ refers to local artists, writers, film-makers, musicians.
A human rights unit, economic affairs and governance, and institutional development division are just a few of their nine divisions. The programs of the many divisions under both the Deputy Secretary-Generals and the Secretary-General’s Office are inter-woven to create a solid framework to achieve global consensus building.

A Source of Assistance for Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication

This mission of the Commonwealth of Nations is facilitated by another organization used as a helping hand, much like the Commonwealth Foundation. The Commonwealth of Learning (COL) is an organization created to aid the Commonwealth member states in achieving their education and training goals.

COL’s mission focuses on helping Commonwealth member states to use technology as a means of increasing the scope, scale, quality and impact of their education and training systems.5

By using their ‘Learning for Development’ program the COL has a three-year plan for increasing development through education and specifically the implementation of technology. There are three sectors of the COL: education, learning for livelihoods and human environment. Access to quality education, information on new teaching methods, alternative forms of schooling and e-learning are all goals of the education sector. Learning for livelihoods focuses on the living environment of possible students and teachers, works to improve their living conditions and then matches that with an opportunity for learning. The human environment division highlights the activities of the other two sectors and their ultimate goals of peace, equity, democracy and sustainable development.

The Use of Language within the Commonwealth Organization

As can be expected, the official language of the Commonwealth is English; however, it is not the only means of communication between members. "Although all members accept the use of the English language as the medium of inter-Commonwealth relations’, the precedent of bilingualism and the biculturalism as well as belonging to both the Commonwealth and La Francophonie has already been established by Canada, Mauritius, Seychelles, Dominica, St. Lucia, Vanuatu and Cameroon."6 The Commonwealth has accredited the Association for Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies to work with member countries when needed; they partake in training and study visits, award cultural prizes in literature and cultural arts, all with the intentions to help member states to build networks and create a capacity for dialogue.

The Commonwealth’s Adhesiveness to their Mission Statement

In a speech given by then Prime Minister of England Tony Blair, the main objectives of the Commonwealth were stated as, “we should challenge the rest of the world to meet the dual objectives of democratic and economic freedom together—because we unite all the continents of the globe, we can set an example for others to follow.”7 This uniting of the globe, as Blair calls it, is also a key point that Mayall uses. However critical, he states that there is a great advantage for member states to access aid and technical programs through their memberships, yet he also states that both funds and assistance programs are becoming increasingly difficult to receive. Mayall continues on to explain the specific missions of the Commonwealth.


6 Mayall, 383.

Among other things it calls on the Secretariat to enhance its capacity 'to provide advice, training and other forms of technical assistance' on such matters as institution-building, legal and constitutional aspects of democratization, the development of electoral machinery and election monitoring, the training of the judiciary, public service reform, and the development of effective parliamentary practices. All these are services offered to governments and assume a measure of self-help by those who signed up to the Harare declaration.8

The author does eventually come to the conclusion that whether or not aid is readily available for all member states, the Commonwealth's mission statement and purpose are worthy to note, "—that they will consult and cooperate 'in the interest of their peoples and in the promotion of international understanding and world peace."9 International understanding and world peace are objectives not only of the Commonwealth but also the OIF, and countless intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.

L’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie

Francophonie opens itself more each day to the world, strengthened by its will to work in the service of all of humanity, conscious of that which it can bring to others and knowing that it needs others in order to flourish.10

—Abdou Diouf
(Secretary General of Francophonie)

The OIF was established in 1970 by the African post-colonial south to promote cooperation, education, the arts, communication, and human rights. The movement to create the organization followed a strong loss in communication and cooperation amongst African countries and between post-colonial Africa and the heart of the francophone culture, France. Under Senegalese leadership, it was born from previous networks of journalists and teachers with the immediate recognition that it was very important to the founders to make this organization non-governmental. The OIF’s agenda quickly became immersed in politics. French Prime Minister François Mitterrand was the first head of state to organize a Francophonie Summit in 1986. The summit consists of the current heads of state of member countries, and has regional themes of progress, topics and solutions. They meet with the intention to set the organization’s agenda, define policy and goals, and measure their international influence. Meeting countries are designated regionally, and the head of state of the host country is the head of that summit.11 The OIF is comprised of 68 states and governments, 13 of which maintain observer status. It spans across five continents affecting 803.44 million people, (12.6 percent of the entire world). It also functions as an excellent networking source for member countries, “Francophonie [OIF] is...in a place of a loose tangle of private societies and semi-public associations, and a combination of transnational cultural organisations with bilateral relations in the areas of politics and economy, we now find a more rationalized organisation integrating all spheres and functioning on an intergovernmental plane.”12

The four major goals of the OIF are: promoting the French language and cultural linguistic diversity, promoting peace, democracy and human rights, supporting education, training, higher education and research, and developing

8 Mayall, 387.
9 Mayall, 385.
10 “La Francophonie s’ouvre chaque jour davantage au monde, forte de sa volonté d’œuvrer au service de toute l’humanité, consciente de ce qu’elle peut apporter aux autres et sachant qu’elle a besoin des autres pour s’épanouir.”—Abdou Diouf (Secrétaire général de la Francophonie) Translated by Ashley Borup.
cooperation to ensure sustainable development and solidarity.¹³

**Promoting the French Language and Cultural Linguistic Diversity**

This mission uses French but recognizes that partner languages can be beneficial for learning. The OIF is used as a network for other international organizations to connect and work together with language to aid joint education programs, help create educational tools, promote public health, and connect with the local population to encourage national and transnational communication. This is done through over 30,000 diplomats in member countries promoting the use of French as a working language.¹⁴ There are three regional centers for the teaching of French in the Asia-Pacific region (Créfap), in the Indian Ocean (Créfoi) and in Europe (Créfeco). Not only has the OIF funded 176 language related projects since 1998, but it also provides around 600 linguists in seven African countries that form a network of technicians and bilingual teachers.¹⁵ This multilingualism is also apparent in Middell’s ‘Francophonia as a World Region?’ Where he notes the release of French as the sole language of communication within the OIF and the movement to involve other languages.

So in place of the normative attachment to the sole presence and centrality of French, what seems an attractive and viable alternative is to elevate the practice of a French-based multilingualism to the level of a distinctive feature of the OIF. At the same time this entails a departure from the attempt by many African and European intellectuals to establish identity via the unity of language and territory.¹⁶

**Promoting Peace, Democracy and Human Rights**

This mission of the OIF is built off of two main declarations: The Declaration of Bamako (2000), establishing a reference text for OIF in the matter of practicing democracy, rights and freedoms within the Francophone region and the Declaration of Saint-Boniface (2006), which discusses the prevention of conflicts and human security. The mission statement as quoted from the OIF is:

> To consolidate democracy, human rights and the rule of law; to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and to help guide the processes of crisis resolution, of democratic transition and of consolidation of peace, these are the objectives of actions created by the OIF Delegation for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights.¹⁷

The OIF fulfills these objectives by contributing to the consolidation of member states and their right to the reinforcement of institutions within their capacities, they aide in the electoral process, enforcement of political agendas, actors, and actions, and the promotion of a democratic culture. The OIF has participated in more than 150 missions within thirty years; examples of these are in Mauritania, Haiti, The Central African Republic, and Guinea. For example, the Parliamentary Assembly, the University Agency of the OIF, and the International Association of French, along with the European Union and the government of Canada worked together on government transitions, stabilization of institutions, and setting up a judicial system in Haiti.

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¹⁷ “Consolider la démocratie, les droits de l’Homme et l’État de droit; contribuer à prévenir les conflits et accompagner les processus de sortie de crise, de transition démocratique et de consolidation de la paix, tels sont les objectifs des actions menées par la Délégation à la paix, à la démocratie et aux droits de l’Homme de l’OIF.” Original quote translated by Ashley Borup.
Supporting Education, Training, Higher Education and Research

This mission of the OIF focuses more specifically on equal access to information for everyone, decreasing gender biases, and education and training for permanent employment. This organization supports an open service of national programs in both professional and technical training. They not only support the teaching and apprenticeship of the French language in OIF member countries, but they also promote literacy in the national languages by working with African Education Systems. Also in the education mission is the local production of scholarly manuals. The OIF believes that education is the framework of development, promoting economic growth, decreasing poverty, working towards the betterment of the female condition and population control.

Developing Cooperation to Ensure Sustainable Development and Solidarity

This topic of the OIF can extend from regional development in the form of youth connections, to women in the community, to more physical means such as well digging or aiding in the production of agricultural goods and shipping. The OIF works with partner organizations to prevent the degradation of the environment, in addition to the research and utilization of renewable energy sources. The OIF partakes in an active role in the international community via conferences and engages in international negotiations on the environment. In the sector of development, the OIF works closely with local communities in order to promote sustainability. It donates the essential needs of a community through micro projects and highly values resources and products.18

Critique of the Francophonie Missions

Even though Middel does promote the use of multilingualism within the OIF as important and useful, he does offer some criticism on the organization as well. He, like Mayall with the Commonwealth, questions the funding for these missions. This query is made evident in his passage:

\[G\]iven the startlingly low amounts of financial support made available by the organs of the OIF for assisting language instruction, upgrading teacher qualifications developing teaching materials and sociolinguistic field research—coupled with the organizational negligence dominant in numerous structures of Francophonia [OIF] vis-à-vis the actual practical problems—it is not surprising that skepticism is on the rise as to whether any definition of francophonia based on the common use of French has any actual basis in reality.19

A critique of the focus of the OIF is being made in this statement as well. A large part of the organization’s funds and manpower is put into the celebration of the arts with film festivals, athletic events and literature and poetry celebrations. Perhaps the use of those funds in order to promote self-sustainability within member countries, or even development, and the transfer of those funds into more beneficial sectors of the OIF, for instance, educational and professional training.

The British Colonization of Fiji: A South Pacific Tea Party of Inequity

Even from the beginning, Fiji has been noted as an atypical colony. In Andrew Scobell’s article “An Analysis of the 1987 Military Coup in Fiji” he states that the British colonized it in 1874 but were given permission to do so by the indigenous peoples through a signed compact from the Great Council of Chiefs. This agreement gave the indigenous Fijians guaranteed ownership of their land while the British assumed a protecting role over both the land and the people of Fiji.20

Not surprisingly the British role in Fiji did not go unnoticed by the Fijians. John D. Kelly’s “Threats to Difference in Colonial Fiji” outlines the role of the colonizers and the reaction in Fiji. “From the earliest days in Fiji, British officials took steps to establish and maintain categories of difference between peoples there.” The differences date back to pre-colonization and the European missionaries who categorized indigenous peoples as either: pagan, heathens in need of saving or simply Christians and non-Christians. Nearly five years after the British settled into Fiji, by 1879, they forced an even more complex social situation by importing indentured labor from India. The Indo-Fijians were used as plantation labor and worked under separate contractual agreements and the customary law established by the British rule governed them.

A distinction between the indigenous Fijians and the Indo-Fijians must be made in order to understand the historical legacies and current political and military conflicts of Fiji today. The indigenous population of Fiji, or Melanesians, “felt a strong sense of affinity and admiration for the British and did not look upon them as colonial oppressors.” A large portion of Fijians converted to Christianity and volunteered to join the British forces during both World Wars. In her article ‘Ceremonial Language in Rural Fiji’ Brison states that indigenous Fijians have a strong sense of community and culture in addition to communal obligations that take the place of economic endeavors.

Unlike the ethnic Fijians, Indo-Fijians (the previous indentured peoples from India) are more individualistic. Majorities are Muslim or Hindu; they have little sense for a community and operate well with economics and within a capitalist structure. They viewed the British negatively as an imperialist power and are still fighting strongly to gain a voice within the government of Fiji.

It took rigorous legal fighting by the Indo-Fijians with the British rule of law to have any representation within the government of Fijians. By 1929 the first three Indo-Fijians that were elected to Fiji’s legislative council left the very first session to boycott due to injustices. This movement began in 1919 due to the end of indentured labor in India caused by several year strikes due to high inflation rates and a refusal to increase wages. After the indentured labor law was passed, Indians originating from British occupied India refused to work, sparking revolts. This provoked a need to compromise for all indigenous peoples in Fiji and thus it became legal to have representation in the legislative council. The boycott demonstrated the need for a common roll voting system where both Indo-Fijians, Fijians and Europeans voted together, not a communal system that had been previously set-up, giving the Indo-Fijians little say. Unfortunately, the Indo-Fijians lost and the system continued to fuel racial and religious discrimination in Fiji, not to mention angering the people and their loss of any actual representation.

By the time the British were starting to let Fiji govern itself, in an attempt to decolonize post World War II, the racial tension had been present for so long by the British that it was now inherently linked to the Fijian culture. Animosity between the two groups, Indo-Fijians and Fijians, has been argued to spring from a cultural distinction (as mentioned previously) as well as a class distinction. Benedict Anderson’s “Imagined Communities” delves into the theory that culture is drawn from a common history and language, a common belief in an imagined history and land ownership. While both groups do share a common language in English, they partake in their ethnic languages as a method of re-igniting their culture.

All Fijians, whether Indo or indigenous share a common history of colonization. Most would expect that this would be a common denominator for the two cultures; however the radically different perspectives on the British Commonwealth create another separation between the two groups. Anderson’s imagined history would refer in this instance to religious background. While Fijians have a tribal commitment they are mostly Christian converts,
whereas the Indo-Fijians are either Muslim or Hindu.

Finally, the issue of land ownership is much more instrumental to fueling the fire in Fiji than one would expect. Initially, Fijians were allowed to own land during colonization, whereas the Indo-Fijians were not able to until nearly a hundred years later. From this birthed the class distinction between the two groups, as the favored Fijians felt they were of higher status than the Indo-Fijians. Also, after their services in the British armies during World Wars I and II Fijian servicemen received compensation from the British government, making them able to create an elite sub-category within the culture. Indo-Fijians laid claim to the culture of Fiji, as they had established a life there for several generations prior. They worked in both the subsistence and commercial industries and form parties within the government system (i.e. National Federation Party).

The 1970 constitution for independent Fiji pegged racial categories and fixed proportions of power between the races, giving crucial advantages to the indigenous Fijians when, at the time, the Indians were 51 percent of Fiji’s population. Following military coups in 1987 that overturned this constitution, a new republic of Fiji constitution provided indigenous Fijians, now 49 percent of the population, a large majority of the electoral seats, and the Indo-Fijians (the Fiji Indians), now 47 percent of the population, disproportionately few.23

It was this close majority rule in Fiji that has forced military coups by the previous Alliance party since 1987 and their continuation until today. The Labour party in 1987 was able to win a few swing seats in the election and gain power from the Fijian side, resulting in a win for the Labour Coalition comprised of the Fiji Labour Party and the National Federation Party. It took only one month of being in office before a military coup of indigenous Fijians claimed their racial superiority to be only party which can preside in Fiji.

In postcoup Fiji, racial identities and rights still vie with political and economic analytics to define the foundations of state and law and overlap with newly vigorous religious and culturalist claims to power, a postcolonial dilemma we will never understand if we presume that political economy is the terrain of history and not a discourse within it.24

With distinguished ethnic separation, whether it is cultural or class, or perhaps a mélange of the two, the question to be considered now is what is the Commonwealth doing, and what can they do to ensure a stable government and fair elections in Fiji? The 2008 military coup in Fiji resulted in a suspended membership from the Commonwealth of Nations until a formal democracy is established. The Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Kamlesh Sharma, has pronounced a commitment by the Commonwealth to aid Fiji with their political instability and to restore democracy. The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group remains in contact with government officials of Fiji, such as the Prime Minister Commodore Bainimarama and the President Ratu Josefa Iloilo and functions with the mission statement to, “continue to support the restoration of civilian constitutional rule in Fiji.” The Secretary General and his Special Representative to the Fiji Islands, Sir Paul Reeves, are working in unison with the United Nations and the Pacific Islands Forum at, “identifying a mediator, who is acceptable to all stakeholders, to facilitate the proposed President’s Dialogue Forum.”25 After the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group is satisfied with the mediation process and negotiations with the interim government to establish a formal democracy, they will then consider the re-instatement of membership status of Fiji.

23 Kelly, 77.
24 Kelly, 80.
Cambodia’s Educational Sector, a Result of the Indochina Back Closet

In R.S. Thomson’s article entitled “The establishment of the French Protectorate over Cambodia” details the relationship between Cambodia and France. Cambodia fell into the hands of the French under the classification of a protectorate, becoming a part of Indochina as a strategic military position for Vietnam. In an effort of territorial expansion, the French used Cambodia as a staging ground for military surges in an attempt to conquer the ‘Far East.’ While the colonial legacy focused mainly on Vietnam and what became Indochina during 1887-1893; Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, were all affected by the dominant Western power. It was in the interest of the French to urbanize and develop Phnom Phen, while many of the rural areas were used for military interests.

The colonial period in Indochina, ending in 1953, left Cambodians disorganized, frail and unprepared for the future of their nation. As a veteran of Cambodia’s many wars stated truthfully, “[Cambodians fought] to protect their country [until 1953, when their French colonizers went home] but all the wars since then have just been fighting for power.” Barr later states that the struggle for power is evident in the country’s placement and historical background, “Cambodia has seen an unparalleled confluence of players and forces: a monarchy, a colonial history, aggressive neighbors, and the powerful ideologies of the cold war.”

Post-colonization Cambodia severely suffered the reign of the Communist Party of Kampuchea led by Pol Pot from 1970-1979. Initially Pol Pot and his group of followers were based in northeast Cambodia. Pol Pot, actually named Saloth Sar, was educated in Paris on a scholarship for technical study. After his studies, Pol Pot worked in the former Yugoslavia for a short period of time. He later returned to Cambodia to join the Communist party for its anti-colonial stance. Post-doctoral Fellow in Education at the University of Sydney David Ayres incorporates Pol Pot’s past into his book ‘Anatomy of a Crisis.’ ‘...[T]here is also no doubt that Pol Pots’ experiences in France and Yugoslavia, and later his affinity with Mao’s China, colored how he perceived the Cambodian situation.’

The May 1975 Conference led by Pol Pot was the peak of power for the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Pol Pot had made his ‘eight points’, his plan for the future of Cambodia: evacuate people from all towns, abolish all markets, abolish Lon Nol regime currency and withhold the revolutionary currency that had been printed, defrock all Buddhist monks and put them to work growing rice, execute all leaders of the Lon Nol regimes beginning with the top leaders, establish high-level cooperatives throughout the country (with communal eating) and expel the entire Vietnamese minority population, dispatch troops to the borders, particularly the Vietnamese border. There was mass murder of ethnic groups, educated peoples, former government employees, those opposed to the regime and high levels of labor displacement from the cities to the fields. Throughout his research, Ayres interviewed many survivors of the regime, one being Ngoy Taing Heng who was evacuated from the east of Cambodia in 1978. Heng claims to have witnessed the murder of more than six thousand people, “the Mekong flowed blood-red.” There is no official death toll of the Pol Pot regime; however Ayres personally interviewed five hundred survivors and his estimate is that 1.67 million perished. The population of Cambodia in 1975 was 7.89 million; making the amount of people murdered 21 percent of the population.

A country that has been engulfed in such turmoil has a seemingly innumerable amount of troubles, ranging from economic and political
stability, to health and development. For the interest of this paper attention to Cambodia's education sector, specifically higher education, and its impact on future development will be drawn.

Stephen J. Duggan examines the educational sector of Cambodia in his article “Education, Teacher Training and Prospects for Economic Recovery in Cambodia.” He states that, “a long period of French colonial rule had not resulted in a vibrant education system. By the mid 1950s, after some seventy years of French colonial rule, there were only nine high schools nationwide and higher education was non-existent.”

Prince Norodom Sihanouk recognized the need for a better education system and took action by investing 20% of the national budget into education. However, he did not understand the repercussions from a boom in the education sector in relation to the labor market. Upon graduation and completion of education, there was nowhere in the economy for them to go. The educated became simply a contribution then to the disgruntled towards Sihanouk. After Sihanouk, the rise and reign of the Khmer Rouge left a complete desecration of the educated class and education system. Not until after the decline of Pol Pot in 1979 did the education sector begin to grow with technical assistance to Cambodia provided by Vietnam and the former Soviet Union. Due to this contribution, nearly 1 million children were enrolled in primary school by 1980 and close to 37,000 teachers were adequately trained. However, even with the rapid growth due to assistance of the educational sector in Cambodia, post-secondary education was still nearly non-existent.

The international community recognized a need for post-secondary education in order to aid in the human resource development base of Cambodia. The World Bank, UNESCO, and the Netherlands Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Education (NUFFIC) all began working in the early 1980s to organize and open accredited universities and technical training institutes in Cambodia. The early nineties prompted various concerned governments to invest in the Cambodian education programs. Australia, France, Norway, and the United Kingdom were the most active donors. Perhaps not directly related to the Francophonie organization, a commitment from the French government of about $18 million for the “refurnishing of classrooms and modernising education programs” was provided. Though the article does not mention the OIF, it does seem that the organization was involved as all of the funding was contingent upon the programs being conducted in French, an instrumental goal of the OIF.

Whether or not the interference of the French government through its various organizations was a help or hindrance to the Cambodian Education Ministry is debatable. It is without question that France, along with organizations such as the World Bank and the European Union and other governments, was a generous donor. However, Duggan critiques their engagement as a method of presence that was less concerned with the educational development of Cambodia and the future of its people. Unfortunately, regardless of the motives, the investment into education was not working adequately, “despite significant language and public policy linked bilateral investments in higher education, the sector remained in poor shape.” This was due to poor donor organization, a lack of skilled personnel in all sectors, and a continually high level of corruption within the Universities (in regards to illegal payments of fees and bribes).

The proposed movement of the education system by Duggan now is to encourage a system of forward planning, understand the failures of the past strategies, and more informed coordination and planning by both donors and the recipient. He states that without these reforms, “the

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34 Duggan, 19.
35 Duggan, 10.
36 Duggan, 11.
higher education system will stagnate off if left to private investment, will rapidly develop into a privatized system beyond control of the Royal Government and its long term education investment framework.”37

It is now essential to understand what the OIF is doing for the educational systems of Cambodia; their general aid donation efforts, the effectiveness of their programs, and the motives of the organizations’ efforts. Cambodia became first an observing member of the OIF in 1991 and was a full member by 1993. The OIF uses the Framework Partnership Document (FPD) as their mission statement for aid donation and use in Cambodia. This document outlines the OIF’s commitment to Cambodia through an economic context, development strategy, and support for the rule of law and good governance, the millennium objectives, and horizontal sectors in France’s development assistance.

Since the Cambodian Ministry of Education is dedicated a percentage of Cambodia’s GDP, it is relevant to understand the economic context of the FPD. Nearly twenty major French companies in addition to about a hundred local companies that are directed or controlled by French nationals are present in Cambodia38. Through the OIF, France has given almost 112 million Euros to bilateral official development assistance in Cambodia. The FPD outlines the need for future assistance by both France and the OIF as the recent economic growth has had a minute impact on poverty, not to mention the failure of Cambodia to reach it’s Millennium Development Goals. France also uses a ‘horizontal approach’ to promote higher education and research which creates cultural diversity and encourages the French language and French NGOs participation. Under the sub-topic of higher education and research, the FPD outlines that, “their [Cambodia’s public and private universities] autonomy is well underway but the emphasis will be on opening them up regionally and strengthening Francophone university networks.”

The Framework Partnership Document also depicts the goal of promoting cultural diversity in the French-speaking world. This includes using French as a teaching language, but also as a vehicle for access to erudite knowledge. Finally, the document re-instates the purpose of the bilateral, OIF and France’s, agreement to aid Cambodia by stating their need for structuring civil society. This means to “ensure that French NGOs are in line with the sectoral strategies supported at a bilateral level, respond to local development initiatives, promote the transfer of competencies and initiatives to Cambodian civil society.”39

The New Hebrides Condominium; an Unusual Agreement

Vanuatu consists of an archipelago of more than eighty islands, only sixty-five of which are inhabited, located in the South Pacific Ocean. It was initially discovered in 1606 by the Portuguese explorer Pedro Fernández de Quirós who thought that he had found the southern continent. In 1768, Louis Antoine de Bougainville visited it, and again in 1774 by Captain Cook, who gave the islands their name of New Hebrides. An increased need for laborers in the South Pacific stripped Vanuatu of nearly half of its male population as they were sent to Australia, Fiji, New Caledonia, and the Samoa Islands.40 During this time period, there was also a large influx of missionaries to the islands followed by a drastic increase of conversion to Christianity. “[T]he missionaries do very useful work in a limited sphere, but they do not attempt to help the heathens, unless the heathens come down to the often unhealthy coast and adopt the externals of Christianity.”41

Through their other colonial possessions, both Britain and France took a strong interest in the available labor market and rich resources of

37 Duggan, 21.
38 This is part of a reciprocal investment protection and promotion agreement signed in 2000.
Vanuatu. A short period of debate, dialogues and possible annexing of the islands led to a unique historical agreement by both the British and the French to jointly colonize the islands. While historically the joint-colonization sounds like a harmonious display of strategy, in all actuality, it was a constant rivalry of power and strength between the two. As stated by Mander in an article published during the colonization, “unfortunately the condominium as the product not of a spirit of genuine international cooperation but rather of a shortsighted rivalry which operated to give the joint government as little power as possible.”

Each imperialist power pressed its own culture, monetary system, judicial system, and governmental system onto the indigenous peoples of Vanuatu, now termed Ni-Vanuatu. Mander later states that the failing status of the joint operation was due to this separation of governing:

[The condominium suffered from the burden of excessive machinery, two sets of laws, two groups of officials, two official languages, two legal currencies, two flags, and even two sets of postage stamps…the convention made no provisions for native education’ the vital question of land reserves was left in vague terms…]

The seemingly harmonic joint-colonization finally met opposition in the 1940’s with the stationing of American troops in Vanuatu. A unique movement of nationalism arose from an influx of World War II troops. On the island of Tanna, the ‘John Frum’ religion was created. It is not known if there was an actual individual named John Frum or if it is an adaptation of “John From America.” The religion, sparked by a native from Vanuatu, promised better housing, clothing, food, and transport. It pledged a new beginning without missionaries where the natives would inherit the wealth of the previous colonizers. In 1941 this cult grew into a nationalist movement, followers abandoned their missionary churches, schools, villages and plantations to resettle inland. It granted American icons such as Santa Claus, Uncle Sam, and John the Baptist god-like status. To this day, February 15th is “John Frum Day” which is celebrated by the “T-A USA” (Tanna Army USA), adorned in white t-shirts and makeshift US Army uniforms, parading in memory of John Frum. This religious cult may not have included all natives of Vanuatu, however, it did spark a larger movement rejecting previous colonial institutions and newfound interest in old cultural practices.

Post independence Vanuatu (independent post-1980) has a population of about 215,000. It is a relatively secure state with a stable government and growing economy. Like most small island nations, it requires an immense amount of foreign aid to remain at this stable level. Vanuatu has a strong reliance on tourism, and agriculture. It has a need for educational improvement, diversification of the economy and a better coordinated and funded disaster management plan.

The lack of necessary elements of infrastructure is due to its colonial past and its unusual nationalist movements drawing from historical culture; however, there is one overarching element in its unique situation, language. There are one hundred and thirteen indigenous languages still actively spoken on the islands. The average population per language is approximately 2000 with the density of languages being the highest per capita of any nation in the world. The three main languages are Bislama (Pidgin English) that is spoken by 72.6 percent of the population, English with 23.1 percent and French as the smallest with 1.9 percent.

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43 Mander, 154.
44 Mander, 154.
The diverse language situation prevents sufficiency within any structure addressing their nation’s problems. The tourism industry faces communication difficulties with Bislama being the main language and would benefit from using more English or French. The language barrier again prevents the diversification of the economy, as it is highly reliant on international aid and multilateral and bilateral business agreements.

Australia and New Zealand are the main suppliers of tourism, Vanuatu’s second largest sector, and its main organization donors are the European Union and the World Bank through bilateral and multilateral programs. Logically it seems as if English would be the language to invest into Vanuatu as the percentage of speakers is much higher than French. However, it is interesting to note that France has committed itself to the future development of Vanuatu through the Framework Partnership Document (FPD) 2006-2010. This document implements fundamental policies to promote self-sufficiency and development, such as: structural reforms making public action more efficient, developing the agricultural and tourism sectors, and improving access to health care, primary education and professional training.

In addition to the necessities of international aid, the FPD carries with it an element of preserving and promoting the French language and culture. It states elements such as creating “true bilingualism” between French and Bislama, and “maintaining the country’s linguistic and cultural wealth” by particularly supporting the Francophone communities.

The irony of the FPD is that while it constantly endorses the French language, it also mentions that English is the lingua franca between the islands and within the public administration. The rivalry between the two previous colonial powers is still inherent within the FPD as well. This excerpt of the document portrays that contention.

If the two former Condominium powers, only France continued an active development aid policy in Vanuatu, the UK having ended its diplomatic representation in October 2005. The European Union was also very committed to Vanuatu through specific or shared actions with France, in the field of agriculture for example.48

It is noted that contributions from the Commonwealth cannot be judged from the OIF written FPD, although, it is difficult to find any amount of programs by the Commonwealth of Nations in Vanuatu. The Commonwealth of Learning organization is one of the only programs directly related to the CON. Its Vanuatu specific project is one for all of the South Pacific and is the Virtual University for the Small States of the Commonwealth (VUSSC). This program works towards providing educational training, technology and supplies to underprivileged members.

Are These ‘Organizations’ Beneficial to Their ‘Member States’?

The OIF and the CON have inherent qualities within their actions. For example, the OIF strongly supports the French language throughout all of their development programs. The CON often times acts with an air of affluence and prefers a zero sum approach to their members and their membership status.49 These qualities sometimes have no effect on their members, yet in other cases it can be detrimental. Thus, in regards to the overarching question, ‘Are these organizations beneficial to their member states?’ The answer is, yes, with hopeless conditionality. They are only beneficial under the right circumstances in which there are three main stipulations. The organization has to take into consideration a member state’s entire history, not just their shared colonial history, as well as their future. It must also formulate policies that perceive the member state as an individual and unique case and personalize those policies to that notion. There must be an allowance for active

49 Using the term Zero-Sum in relation to the Community Psychology definition indicating that there must be one winner and one loser, an all or nothing approach.
participation from the member state in order to prioritize correctly their needs.

In the case of Fiji, the CON does not take into account the member state’s entire history. It acts as if there was no decolonization period by continually interfering with the government structure and election process. This intrusion into the Fijian government may be disguised as a diplomatic process, yet in actuality it is interference. During colonization it resounded with negative impacts. Today it is nothing more than actions that will only cause more separation between the ethnic groups in Fiji. With this in mind, it is dually noted that the CON’s Zero-Sum approach to membership really hinders their member states, including Fiji. The suspension of membership status during the time of a crisis is not only damaging to the member, but it is irresponsible of the organization. Not only is the CON not giving the support that its member needs during crucial moments, but it is also ruining any future plans for self-sustainability.

The situation of Cambodia and the OIF has the same interactions between the organization’s inherent qualities and influence on their actions. However, in this specific case study they work to benefit Cambodia. This is due in large part to the personalization of the Framework Partnership Document and its allowed specificity to the member state along with a strong voice from Cambodia. When making the FPD with France and the OIF, Cambodia made sure that their priorities were voiced. Several clauses within the document reference the Paris Accords allowing the promotion and protection of the French language, while also maintaining the cultural heritage and language of Cambodia. These two factors (personalization, representation of Cambodia) are the fundamental differences why the OIF works positively for Cambodia.

The originality of Vanuatu is not only left to the history books. Its uniqueness in respect to its relationships with both the OIF and the CON still holds true. The case of the CON is not complex, as it simply is not doing much for Vanuatu. It has one educational program through the Commonwealth of Learning, it is not a major aid donor, its business sector is not enhanced by the UK, and the tourism industry relies mainly on Australia and New Zealand. With English being the most logical choice for supporting growth and development in Vanuatu, it is again negligent of the CON to turn a blind eye to this member state.

The OIF, on the other hand, is a bit more interesting. Like Cambodia, Vanuatu also has a Framework Partnership Document with France and the OIF. In this instance, the inherent qualities of the OIF produce negative impacts for Vanuatu. The OIF’s goal of promoting and maintaining the French language harms the ever-growing tourism industry and only relates to the 1.9% of the population. This seemingly positive cultural promotion tactic, when used in a small community like Vanuatu, actually becomes a method of cultural marginalization that excludes 98.1% of the Vanuatu people. With half the accountability in the hands of the OIF, the latter half lies within the government of Vanuatu. Agreements and clauses within the FPD should have included more emphasis on a bilingual program including the promotion of English, as it is the most logical way to boost the tourism industry and aid in diversifying the economy.

Some members of the academic community will argue that post-colonial organizations are just another means of controlling their former colonies. An extensive look of both the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie and the Commonwealth of Nations in relation to several case studies will prove that there are inherent but not intentional qualities. The amount of effect that these qualities have depends on the specific member state and their previous, current and future situation. Continual membership status coupled with a strong voice from the member state will prevent the negative effects. To conclude and serve as a rebuttal to the academic community, organizations like the OIF and CON have the capacity and opportunity to benefit a member country. Nevertheless it is up to the member state to understand the inherent qualities of these organizations and to attribute them to a relationship that mutually benefits both parties involved.