

**Co-management of Cultural Landscapes: Collaborating to Compete at Mt.
Pulag National Park, the Philippines**

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

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Regional planning has long asked how to combine local control and regional resource management. The international trend to decentralize governance and promote co-management or other stakeholder-based approaches to regional landscape management is consistent with emerging collaborative spatial planning theory. Regional landscapes could be managed through flexible networks of governmental and customary institutions (Healey 1999, 2006). Through dialogue, parties assert multiple cultural perspectives, share knowledge, and forge shared landscape values and commitments. Therefore, over time one would expect shared plans to be voluntarily implemented through the respective authority of partnering institutions, communities, and agencies. Other planning theorists fault collaborative planning for assuming speech is undistorted, for neglecting issues of formal and disciplinary power, for glossing over historical and cultural contexts, and the for ignoring the centers of power where decisions are actually made. More fundamentally, both co-management and collaborative practice often assume that indigenous and other participants share an interest in agreement. Political economists have found that co-management and stakeholder approaches inaccurately assume egalitarian indigenous and community partners

that may actually deploy co-management and other institutions in the continued competition for resources (Agrawal and Gibson 2001; Leach et al. 1999).

This case study of protected area co-management at Mt. Pulag National Park, the Philippines, explains how and why local governments and indigenous communities used a collaborative, decentralized local governance and indigenous rights provisions to strategically pursue their own interests and divide the landscape, despite a plan to protect its shared cultural and ecological importance. Focusing on overlapping park, ancestral domain, and municipal boundary conflicts and drawing from other cases, the study concludes that Philippine decentralization law provides financial incentives for competition that outweigh the locally perceived benefits of co-management in this context. Overlapping, ambiguous, and inconsistently implemented laws provided multiple alternatives to implementation of agreements, especially without a stronger regional governance institutions and attendance to cultural and historical context. Findings support the need for continued research that focuses on power and the interrogation of assumptions made by advocates of collaboration and decentralization.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Problem

Regional planning has long struggled with how to forge a commitment among jurisdictions and interests to manage places that extend across political and cultural boundaries. The “new paradigm” (Innes, 1995) of collaborative and communicative planning emphasizes de-centered approaches that rely on communication to forge consensus on action among interests (Forester, 1989, 1999b; Healey, 1993; Innes, 1986, 1995) and to address other epistemologies, values, and stories of place (Sandercock, 1998). Expanding this idea to systems of governance, collaborative spatial planning theory suggests that regional places can be managed through networks of institutions and collaborative governance institutions that facilitate shared landscape values as the basis for shared plan implementation (Healey, 1997a, 1999).

Converging with communicative and collaborative planning, international conservation practice embraced stakeholder-based approaches to obtaining local support in the management of resources that extend across political and ethnic boundaries (Lane, 2001a). The International Conservation Union (IUCN) and 2003 World Parks Congress embraced the concept that places should be managed as *cultural landscapes* through *co-management* and networks with indigenous people, local governments, and those who have historically maintained the knowledge of and identity with places (World Parks Congress, 2003a; 2003b; 2003c). The IUCN

defines three types of participatory management: 1) *decentralization*¹ of authority to local institutions; 2) collaborative or *co-management* involving the sharing of authority with local institutions; and 3) stakeholder *consultation*, in which park agencies do not share decision-making authority (Borrini-Feyerabend 2005; Lucas, 2003; Renard, 1997). Co-management describes partnership—local governments and indigenous communities collaborate with park management, sharing their knowledge and authority to help protect landscapes and resources within and around parks and protected areas. Advocates of both co-management and collaborative planning hope or assume that participants share an interest in adopting a common plan. The problem is that proscriptions and assumptions may obscure, rather than address, place-based conflicts by neglecting to address the divergent interests of multiple actors, the processes by which they interact, and the institutions that influence outcomes (Agrawal & Gibson, 2001). Protected areas provide a rich empirical context for observing the results of collaborative planning theory in practice (Lane, 2001a).

Philippine laws illustrate collaborative spatial planning concepts and exemplify the World Parks Congress 2003 and IUCN recommendations for co-management of indigenous cultural landscapes. The Philippines devolved substantial natural resource protection authority to local governments and indigenous communities that comprise the membership of collaborative Protected Area Management Boards (PAMB). In addition, the Republic adopted decentralization in its 1991 Local Government Code. Finally, the Philippines is the only country in Asia

¹ I use the term decentralization to refer to “devolution” of resource management authority to elected local governments to distinguish it from the devolution of powers to non-government groups and from deconcentration of central government agencies to local or regional field offices, with reference to Hutchcroft 2001 and Ribot 1999 as further explained in the literature review.

that has officially used the term indigenous peoples and recognized their rights to and formal participation in national protected areas (Ferrari, 2003).² The Philippines, therefore, has tried to implement the co-management paradigm; which is a partnership that shares national, local, and indigenous authority through law or agreements and that specifies institutional roles, responsibilities, and territorial rights for resource management (Ferrari, 2003; World Parks Congress, 2003c). Philippine scholars Paje (1999) and Ballesteros (2001), observing the overlapping layers of Philippine laws for decentralization, protected area co-management, and indigenous rights, asked the fundamental question of this study; *will these overlapping indigenous, state, and local government authorities lead to collaborative partnerships or destructive competition?* One of the 17 mega-diversity countries that contains 70% to 80% of global species on its 7,100 islands, the Philippines has experienced the most severe decline in the world (Ong, 2002). Only 3% of the original 95% rainforest coverage remains and the Philippines has priority as a “hotspot” for international NGO, bi-lateral, and European-sponsored conservation efforts (www.cepf.net/philippines_info). The Philippines also represents human and cultural diversity, with more than 110 native languages spoken by people living in and around the places targeted for conservation (www.ncca.gov.ph). Cultural and natural conservation goals are challenged by the highest population growth and one of the slowest economic growth rates in Asia (Collas-Monsod, Monsod, & Duacanes, 2004).

² The Asian Development Bank regards indigenous peoples as those with a social or cultural identity distinct from the dominant or mainstream society. The Philippine constitution of 1987 defines them as homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, as further defined in Chapter 3.

This case study focused on Mt. Pulag National Park in the Cordillera region of Luzon, created in 1987 by Presidential Proclamation through a debt-for-nature swap, was one of eight protected areas funded in the mid-1990s by the European Union to demonstrate co-management (Figure 1). As further described in Chapter 3, the area comprised multiple indigenous peoples and local governments representing multiple local governments with competing conservation, cultural rights, and economic development interests in the protected area. As the highest and most accessible mountain in the Philippines, Mt. Pulag is a major national and international hiking destination. Co-management faced multiple challenges.

A robust theoretical debate continues on whether or not communicative and collaborative approaches result in shared epistemological meanings, address discursive or institutional power differences, or produce equitable and inclusive plans (Huxley & Yiftachel, 2000; Stiftel, 1990). Some argue that planning theory should examine institutions, the role of the state, and spatial policies (Huxley & Yiftachel, 2000; Sager, 2002; Yiftachel, 1995; 2000). Patsy Healey addressed this debate by adding “new institutionalism” to collaborative theory (see elaboration in Healey, 1999 and 2006, pp. 324–330). Her spatial planning theory emphasizes the dynamic social learning aspect of managing conflict and linking formal government structures and customary institutions. Similarly, co-management links community with state governance systems (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005) to incorporate local knowledge and social-ecological systems (Berkes, 2006) into an evolving conservation practice (Olsson, Folke, & Berkes, 2004). Co-management is also criticized for assuming egalitarian community partners, rather than examining actors, processes and

institutions (Agrawal and Gibson, 2001). Collaborative spatial planning and co-management both assume that dialogue builds relationships as the basis for environmental care and social justice (Healey, 1999; 2006, p. 317). Desired outcomes include cultural landscape perspectives and knowledge, management of conflicts, and sustained institutions for collaborative governance, but many assumptions remain unexplored.

Political economists have suggested that collaborative and co-management institutions may be among many “material and symbolic resources” in particular contexts where there are ongoing struggles for resources, rights, and entitlements (Leach et al., 1999). Given the importance placed on conflict management, a recent review of natural resource management research (Wilshusen et al. 2002) recommended examining the effect that the institutional structure of decentralization and representation has on conflict resolution in the adoption of multi-interest and multi-jurisdictional conservation and land use plans. In addition, proponents of using co-management to address indigenous rights and knowledge have not attended to the “radically different social contexts in which resource managers and aboriginal people are embedded” and to the political purposes of those who call for co-management (Nadasdy, 1999, p. 6). Finally, collaborative planning research, which has studied the process of stakeholder agreement making, should attend to the “social relations and opportunity structures” on which the benefits of collaborative approaches are contingent (Healey, 2006, p. 322).

Attention to social relations, governance institutions, and issues of power is especially critical when land use plans involve indigenous peoples and their cultural

landscapes. Indigenous peoples have been defined as self-identified marginal groups and minorities that maintain distinct political, economic, social, and legal systems and identities within a national state (Maybury-Lewis, 1992). Groups often seek protection of their land, cultural, and self-governance rights in addition to participation in land use decisions that affect the lands they consider essential to cultural survival (UNESCO, 1994). Cultural landscapes can be defined as ethnographic landscapes—extended use areas and corridors that members of traditionally associated groups define and that often extend across several governmental jurisdictions (Evans, Roberts, & Nelson, 2001). Their use is often contested. However, within these landscapes, there are multiple actors who can appropriate resources or who are affected by outside economic pressures (Agrawal & Gibson, 2001). In the Philippines, indigenous people are those whose ancestors resisted 500 years of assimilation into the Spanish and American empires and therefore retained culture and customs (Scott, 1971). According to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, there are more than 12 million indigenous peoples of 110 ethno-linguistic groups in the Philippines, or 10% of the population primarily residing within the 50% of the country that is mountainous (NCIP, 2006) (Figure 2, Chapter 1).

Because the Mt. Pulag Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) (collaborative governance institution) is comprised entirely of indigenous peoples who control local governments, and the park plan affirmed a shared sacred landscape, one could expect the desired results of co-management paradigm and collaborative spatial planning (Healey, 1999): the adoption of shared landscape values and

indigenous knowledge; the management of conflict; and plan implementation by partners. Instead, there was a paradox of competition between represented municipalities claiming indigenous rights and using the very laws that structured co-management.

Healey questioned under what conditions collaborative governance has the intended results, arriving at the conclusion that more contextualized research is needed, just as Agrawal and Gibson (2001) called for a more nuanced understanding of co-management processes and institutions. Those concerned with inclusive governance, environmental sustainability, and social justice should attend to local politics and cultural processes—to the “interactive qualities of situated arenas of governance practice” (p. 325). Drawing on political anthropology, political economy, and conflict theory, as summarized below, this study explains how and why key members of a co-management board competed for territory in the context of changing indigenous rights and governance. This study responds by examining interests, actors, and strategies – by attending to the institutional context of decisions. Findings will emphasize that people redefine paradigms and concepts (Escobar, 1995, 1999), and therefore, planning and co-management should not be implemented as acts of faith. Findings also suggest that clear and unambiguous, rather than overlapping, rights and authorities could be conditions important to the goals of collaborative governance. I conclude by suggesting that regional governance institutions be re-examined for mediating national and local interests and actors, and that comparative cases apply disciplines such as anthropology in order to understand collaborative spatial planning theory and co-management practice.

Theoretical Perspectives on Collaborative Spatial Planning and Co-management

Collaborative spatial planning theory provides a conceptual rubric for multiple theories of social and spatial dynamics and governance at multiple scales (Healey, 2006, p. 321). Healey (1999) emphasizes the interactive relationship between structure and agency (referring to Giddens, 1984, among others), to suggest that collaborative governance would result in social learning and a shared sense of landscape among the stakeholders. This new layer of landscape understanding would be the basis of voluntary plans implemented through networks of customary and governance institutions. Rather than explain social behavior, Healey continues to refine a normative approach that draws from multiple social, geographic, and political theories to design governance for multi-cultural places. Healey (2006) answered critics regarding power differences by emphasizing the contingent nature of collaborative spatial planning, contingencies investigated here.

Concepts and Theories

Co-management and decentralized approaches are intended to improve biodiversity protection by incorporating traditional knowledge and management practices (sources cited in Nadasdy 1999; 2003). Many issues are debated in the literature regarding this claim, including the nature and original context of such knowledge, the problem of requiring indigenous people in parks to remain traditional, the adequacy of indigenous practices for biodiversity protection given contemporary resource pressures, and other issues outside the scope of this study. In the planning literature, Scott (1998) recommended “metis-friendly” institutions that would adapt

and combine forms of indigenous and scientific knowledge. Similarly, adaptive co-management should be designed to combine, over time, the strengths of government and local-level resource management across multiple spatial scales and vertical levels of government to provide a setting for conflict resolution and addressing multiple claims (Cash & Berkes, 2006; Olsson, Folke, & Berkes, 2004). Although collaborative spatial theory is not predictive, it assumes that shared and decentralized governance are more likely to address cultural landscape values in plans (Healey, 2006, p. 319) As summarized below, anthropologists, geographers, political economists, and conflict theorists have explored the following assumptions and concepts that are inadequately addressed in collaborative planning and co-management:

1. Epistemology/knowledge, cultural landscapes, scale and boundaries;
2. Multiple public interests, power, and conflict;
3. Social structure of community, representation, and rights;
4. The co-management connection between government and indigenous institutions; and
5. Conditions for conflict management.

Indigenous Knowledge, Cultural Landscapes, and Boundaries

One goal of co-management is to draw on local and indigenous knowledge to manage landscapes that have cultural as well as natural value. The concept of “culture” has evolved in anthropology to avoid uniform description of groups; however, the concept may continue to describe learned and “shared patterns of behavior and thought” (Bernard, 1998). The intent to “incorporate” indigenous and cultural knowledge gives insufficient regard to social institutions, as explained in Nadasdy’s studies of co-management in the Yukon (1999).

“Traditional [cultural] knowledge is not so much a set of discrete intellectual products as it is a way of life...one aspect of broader cultural processes that are embedded in complex networks of social relations, values, and practices which give them meaning” (p. 13).

Nadasdy argues that professionals and state institutions exert disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977) to incorporate indigenous, local, or “traditional ecological knowledge” (TEK) into plans as discrete values or management practices without questioning the conflicting nature of knowledge itself or the power relations inherent in who does the “incorporation.”

Scott applied a concept of “metis” to represent the practical, adaptable, and situated knowledge that is overrun by the hubris of centralized government plans, but which is necessary to local feasibility and benefits. However, communicative and collaborative planning theory uses a concept of indigenous or cultural knowledge (Geertz, 1983) that emphasizes meaning, worldviews, values, stories, and “other ways of knowing” (Healey, 1999; Sandercock, 1998; Umemoto, 2001) rather than social institutions through which knowledge is maintained or expressed. In addition, cultural knowledge is not static, but is affected by introduced planning and governance institutions and deployed for political purposes (Nadasdy, 1999).

The international World Heritage Convention cultural landscape definition (Lucas, 2003; Phillips, 2002) later recognized the importance of landscapes to lifeways, but obscured conflicts between resident and international protection concepts and agendas. The World Heritage category of “living cultural landscapes,” (Category V) deems as worthy of protection the continued cultural use and intangible cultural spiritual knowledge of landscapes (World Parks Congress, 2003a; Lucas, 2003; Phillips, 2002).

However, the international designation of such resources changes their purpose. The IUCN assumed that participation in heritage site planning protects cultural rights (Scanlon, 2002; Von Droste, 1995). Anthropologists, on the other hand, have documented how the epistemological nature of landscapes are place-based and embedded in social systems. For example, Apache wisdom “sits in places” and is transmitted through stories told at those places (Basso, 1996), and therefore not easily documented in plans. Parties may share the goal of resource protection, but indigenous concepts and resource management institutions may remain at odds with the epistemological assumptions, methods of representation, and jurisdictional boundaries of their planning partners (Nadasdy, 1999, p. 6).

Cultural landscapes may be fluid places. Recent conservation literature also notes the hubris of assuming that indigenous practice is “primitive” or naturally environmentally sound, given shrinking land bases, economic challenges, and competition for land resources (Neumann, 1997). In addition, Berkes (1999) warns that planning institutions change culture. The replacement of local institutions with centralized ones involves a change from folk to scientific knowledge with multiple impacts on local institutions.

In the conservation literature, the terms traditional ecological knowledge and local knowledge are used interchangeably, but cultural landscape boundaries are not fixed or always local, as documented in how Australian aboriginal landscapes change in time and space with the movement of spiritual leaders through those places (Munn, 2003; Rodman, 2001). Geographers have demonstrated how Andean agricultural knowledge and practice in Peru is maintained regionally, not locally. The genetic

diversity of customary corn, tuber, quinoa, and other seeds continues because families use a kin network to access a variety of ecological zones across a region (Zimmerer & Young, 1988, 1996). Social relations to places are changed when they become international focal points for protection, as has occurred at the Philippine Rice Terraces World Heritage Site, located near Mt. Pulag National Park in the Cordillera region of the Philippines, where the intricate rice terraces and irrigation systems constructed and maintained by the Ifugao relied on kinship systems weakened by new economic opportunities such as sale of wood carvings (UNESCO, 1995).

Ethnographic landscapes are herein defined and assigned meaning by the people who consider them essential to their ongoing cultural survival (Evans, Roberts, & Nelson, 2001), but the landscapes may be regional, not local, and policies that emphasize local participation may be inadequate to representing indigenous landscape knowledge and meanings into plans. When “local” is equated with culture and knowledge, decentralized governance is prescribed as the mechanism for incorporating indigenous perspectives into plans. Decentralization may create a mismatch between local government boundaries and what may be a regional scale of indigenous cultural landscape practices. An additional example was provided by Naughton-Treves (1999), documenting wildlife protection in Uganda, where locally perceived cultural landscape boundaries differed depending on the season and the animal. Counter or community mapping efforts intended to document cultural landscapes assume linear boundaries and inadequately address social systems of land use and landscape management (Walker & Peters, 2001). Cross-boundary stewardship systems, such as co-management, should consider attitudes toward

property, boundaries, and different social uses of natural resources along with habitat scale (Brunson, 1998).

Given the situated nature of cultural landscape and indigenous knowledge, case study research should include, rather than presume, the parameters of cultural landscape knowledge and management institutions in a particular case of social change. Healey (1999) asserts that collaborative spatial planning theory is necessarily multi-cultural and required to address different landscape values and meanings. In order for planning to address indigenous cultural landscapes, more attention will be required not only to stories, songs, and rituals (Sandercock, 1998), but to social and institutional systems of changing relationships and land use.

Multiple Public Interests, Power, and Planning Theory

Planning links scientific and technical knowledge to action in the public domain, and each planning approach assumes different social theories (Friedmann, 1987). Two groups of planning theories address multiple public interests and power differences: radical planning and planning as social learning (including communicative and collaborative approaches) The previously dominant epistemology of planning—best encapsulated by the rational-comprehensive paradigm—marginalized aboriginal perspectives as irrational (Innes, 1995; Innes & Booher, 1999a; Sandercock, 1998). The communicative planning “paradigm shift” (Innes, 1995) replaced reliance on positivist knowledge with communicative knowledge developed through dialogue, during which power relations could be managed by the planner (Innes, 1995). Critics fault collaborative planning—both consensus-building approaches (Forester, 1989; Innes & Booher, 1999) and the critical pragmatism

(Forester, 1989; Healey 1997)—for assuming that structured dialogue can address power differences through undistorted speech (Sager, 2002).

Communication is strategically distorted, at times, in order to achieve social justice (Kaufman, 1990; Sager, 1999). Communicative action and collaborative planning try to avoid a longer-term planning problem of conflicting public interests by collapsing knowledge into action and by assuming that human beings share a natural, adaptive predisposition to using inquiry to solve problems (Hoch, 1984a). These approaches are also criticized for stifling theory --building by glossing over historical, cultural, spatial, and cognitive realities. The participatory event is emphasized over the context and centers of power where decisions are actually made (Beauregard, 2001; Neuman, 2000). Critics cite Foucault (1977) to highlight the dangers of inclusion when disciplines and agencies set the terms of discourse (Escobar, 1992; 1996; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Foucault, 1977). Finally, critics argue that collaborative theory fails to specify the *conditions* under which participants would be motivated to dialogue and reach consensus (Flyvbjerg, 2002). Planners should examine, rather than assume, the role of the state and spatial policies in outcomes of collaborative approaches (Fainstein, 2000; Huxley & Yiftachel, 2000).

Collaborative planning shares terrain with theories of mediation and conflict management (Susskind ed., 1999) that more thoroughly discuss how agreements are reached within a particular dialogue. Treated as differences in values or worldviews, indigenous perspectives might be addressed through different ways of “framing” problems (Gray, 2003) or through agreement on actions that address different values (Forester, 1999a). However, land use disputes with indigenous peoples that involve

threats to collective identity and culture and land rights were often found most intractable (see summary in Caton Campbell, 2003). This intractability was often attributed to different values or worldviews, and therefore amenable to reframing (Gray), but this process strategy may not manage conflict when rights are at stake (Gray, 2003; Lewicki, Gray, & Elliot, 2003). When rights can be pursued outside the process, parties may negotiate in order to avoid agreement (Wallihan, 1998), as has been documented in disputes over resource extraction within indigenous landscapes where people also masterfully deployed western concepts and knowledge to gain strategic advantage when they lacked formal power (Rangan & Lane, 2001).

Collaborative spatial planning tries to bridge several concepts and arguments by considering the institutional context of dialogue, indigenous social and political institutions, and agency of participants. “Regional or spatial planning should be imagined as linking overlapping centers of local knowledge by linking institutions and creating space for policy discourse in which multiple identities are asserted (Healey, 1999, p. 118). However, the construct tends to idealize the context in which people deploy knowledge in planning (Campbell, 2005). Indigenous people throughout the world are demanding not just a seat at the planning table, but rights to land, culture, economic development, self-governance, and the use of customary law to resolve conflicts (UNESCO, 1994). As some have indicated indigenous participation in partnerships is not just a matter of communication and learning, but is a matter of strategy and self-government within the state (Lane, 2001b).

Decentralization and Community

Although planning theory does not specify conditions for effectiveness, co-management literature increasingly recommends that both decentralization and national recognition of indigenous rights accompany co-management (World Parks Congress, 2003b). As applied by the IUCN, participatory and decentralized processes should help protect indigenous rights and incorporate indigenous knowledge into plans for nationally and internationally significant protected areas and World Heritage Sites (Beltran, 2000). Decentralization, which is assumed as a foundation for co-management, includes several different types of power transfers. Ribot (1999) defined decentralization as the devolution of central assets and powers to local or private decision-making bodies (including both local governance and privatization in this term); and de-concentration as the de-centering of national agencies to local settings. Ribot labelled the empowerment of elected local governments as political decentralization, in contrast to privatization that empowers NGOs or business partners (p. 27). Hutchcroft argues the need to distinguish administrative from political devolution and de-concentration and suggests a continuum in order to improve analysis, rather than act with faith in decentralized governance. In the Philippines, for example, some forms of “autocratic decentralization” devolve authority to a local enclave of elites, and some central government rules enable democratic participation by limiting coercive options of local officials (Hutchcroft 2001). Decentralization refers here to the Local Government Code that partially transferred decision and regulatory authority and funds from central to local units of government, as distinguished from devolution to nongovernmental and people’s

organizations (NGOs) that have legally prescribed participation in government and resource management decisions in the Philippines.

In co-management, the state retains some authority, even if only the policy framework (Renard, 2003). However, co-management also assumes a “community” partner (Persoon et al., 2003) and the synthesis of local and national goals and interests. Collaborative spatial planning theory assumes that decentralized governance promotes dialogue and participation, while co-management guidelines recommend 1) decentralization of decisions to the most local level, and 2) recognition of indigenous rights in addition to indigenous participation on a stakeholder-type structures (Colchester, 1996; Phillips, 2002). There is much literature that critiques community-based conservation and considers common property as a management tool, but it is beyond the scope of this review. Political economists, however, have critiqued co-management for assuming that egalitarian indigenous communities are represented in partnerships, and for obscuring differences in power and interests (Agrawal & Gibson, 2001; Leach et al., 1999).

Political economists consider the structure of the community, representation, and the accountability and diversity of actors and interests within a particular setting as critical to the assumed benefits of decentralization and co-management (Agrawal & Gibson, 2001; Agrawal & Ribot, 1999a). They call for studies of the interaction of customary with national governance institutions and frameworks. In addition to sidestepping the problem of intra-community gender and power differences, co-management proponents (and planning theorists) often fail to distinguish between the devolution of powers to local governments and devolution to forms of indigenous

self-government. In Australia, many national parks are owned by indigenous groups, whereas in Canada, co-management often substitutes for a transfer of land management rights to indigenous peoples (Lane, 1999; Wolfe-Keddie, 1995). Some suggest that the effectiveness of decentralization in representing indigenous interests may depend on the power of legitimate and indigenously controlled institutions to participate (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999), and a strong state role to manage political relationships (Rangan & Lane, 2001, with reference to Abers, 2000). More specificity about assumptions and concepts is preferable to equating “local” with “indigenous.”

Berkes (2006) suggests that more systematic information is needed on co-management and other cross-scale institutions and the reasons for success or failure at different scales. Both co-management and collaborative planning case studies are focused on group decision-making by the group with less attention to the implemented of plans and decisions by represented and non-represented agencies, or to the regional- and national-level governance context of co-management. For example, the largest impacts on protected areas are often not due to the actions of resident peoples asked to participate, but rather the actions of government and private parties that build roads or provide mining concessions (Naughton-Treves, Chapman, & Kammen, 2005). Both collaborative and co-management research seem disconnected from theories of regional planning and governance, where incentives for implementing mediated and negotiated agreements might be examined. New regionalism has parallels with Healey’s collaborative spatial planning, in that it that supports voluntary agreements among local governments and civic organizations, rather than recommending regional authorities (Fishman, 2000; Foster, 1997; Katz,

2000). Another approach is suggested by Young's (2000) "differentiated solidarity" concept—where multiple and overlapping sovereignties can co-exist through regional federalism among jurisdictions. In addition to problems of scale and assumptions about indigenous knowledge and communities, more work is needed on how local actors use these governance innovations in order to question the assumed common interest in collaboration and consider how to support landscape governance across boundaries.